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Article
Emergent Disability and the Limits of Equality:
A Critical Reading of the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Beth Ribett
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities marks a
shift in international legal relationships to, and conceptions of,
disability. The Convention is the first binding international instrument
of its kind related to disability. Its premises differ from the earlier World
Programme on Disability, and more closely integrate the frameworks of
U.S. domestic equal protection and disability civil rights law. Drawing
on critical race and feminist theory, this Article critically examines the
implications of internationalizing a U.S. disability law framework, with
particular attention to the problem of "emergent disability," or disability
which is specifically produced as a consequence of social inequity or state
violence.
I. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities (hereinafter "the Convention") opened for state signatories on
March of 2007, following adoption by the General Assembly in December
of 2006.1 The Office of the Joint Secretariat, which administered the
t Beth Ribet is currently a visiting scholar at the UCLA School of Law, and a Research
Associate at the Burton Blatt Institute at Syracuse University. She also recently joined New
York Law School as an adjunct member of the faculty. She received her Ph.D. in Social
Relations at University of California-Irvine, and her J.D. at UCLA, with a concentration in
Critical Race Studies. Thanks to Lorraine Bonner, Malika Chatterji, Paul Longmore, Kimberl
Crenshaw, Gyasi Williams, Leslie Bunnage, Christine Littleton, Russell Robinson, and the
Disability Studies Reading Group through the UCLA School of Law Critical Race Studies
Program, for critical feedback, dialogue, and insights contributing to this Article, and to
DaThao Nguyen for technical support. Thanks also to Jeff Davenport for assistance in article
submission.
1. See United Nations Enable, http://www.un.org/disabilities/index.asp (last visited June
23, 2009) [hereinafter Enable]; Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res.
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implementation of the Convention, notes that transnational support, at least
as indicated by the number of signatories on its opening day, exceeded that
of any previous UN convention. 2 In July of 2009, President Obama initially
committed the United States as a signatory, although formal
implementation still awaits Congressional ratification.? Although there has
been no equivalent document in the history of global disability rights, the
Convention was not entirely lacking precedent in international legal
conceptualization of disability. Namely, the United Nations designated the
year 1982 as the "International Year of Disabled Persons," ultimately
leading to the formulation of the "World Programme of Action Concerning
Disabled Persons." 4
The World Programme is indicative of the type of international legal
document that international legal theorists generally characterize as "soft"
law, in the sense that its provisions are not binding on states or
organizations outside of the UN's own internal bodies. However, as the
first major international legal document posing a comprehensive platform
that conceptualizes disability as a political, medical, and social
phenomenon, it would be an error to dismiss it as lacking any wider
practical import. The World Programme remains particularly relevant to
this analysis, as it anticipated the underlying philosophy of the
Convention.5
The World Programme largely prioritized the ideal of "equalization of
opportunities," which it defined as follows: "Equalization of opportunities
means the process through which the general system of society, such as the
physical and cultural environment, housing and transportation, social and
health services, educational and work opportunities, cultural and social life,
including sports and recreational facilities, are made accessible to all." 6
In addition to this primary goal, it also engendered some discussion of
rehabilitation and particularly of prevention. The latter term is broken
down into primary and secondary categorizations. Primary prevention
refers to actually preventing "impairment" entirely, while secondary
prevention refers to minimizing its consequences, both individually and
socially.8
The text of the Convention partially parallels that of the World
61/106, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/106 dan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Convention].
2. See Enable, supra note 1.
3. See Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Signing of U.N. Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (July 24, 2009),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the press.-office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-Rights-of-
Persons-with-Disabilities-Proclamation-Signing/.
4. See World Programme of Action Concerning Disabled Persons, United Nations,
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/diswpa00.htm (last visited June 23, 2009)
[hereinafter Programme].
5. The philosophical link to the World Programme is explicitly noted in the preamble to
the Convention. Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
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Programme, mainly in framing equality as the primary concern of
international legal intervention in the status of persons with disabilities.
Although the language of the Convention reflects more contemporary
concepts of "universal design" 9 with less emphasis on the term
"equalization of opportunity," its general tenor is mostly consistent both
with the language of several other international conventionso and with
conceptions of anti-discrimination and equal protection intrinsic in the U.S.
domestic legal system.11 While the specific term "rehabilitation" has
mostly vanished from the later document, 12 the Convention recalls many of
the goals of earlier rehabilitation language, reframed in terms of "living
independently," "personal mobility," and to some extent, within the
imperative to promote "accessibility."13 However, the goal of "prevention,"
particularly "primary prevention," has been distinctly eliminated from the
Convention, either in its original language as reflected in the World
Programme, or in any explicit goal geared towards altering the context in
which "impairments" initially occur.14 In this respect the language and
agendas represented in the Convention are more closely consistent, for
instance, with those embedded in the U.S. domestic statute, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (hereinafter ADA), in that they emphasize the
individual rights of persons with disabilities to equal access to resources
and public spaces, and to equal treatment under law, without any
interventionist agenda concerning the emergence or production of
disabilities. 5
In this Article, I scrutinize the implications of eliminating prevention
language from the Convention. 16 In taking on this task, I must first
9. See Convention, supra note 1, art. II (defining universal design as "the design of
products, environments, programmes and services to be usable by all people, to the greatest
extent possible, without the need for adaptation or specialized design. 'Universal design' shall
not exclude assistive devices for particular groups of persons with disabilities where this is
needed.")
10. Id. pmbl. The Preamble to the Convention invokes the seven other primary UN
International Conventions as consistent with its intentions.
11. I note the similarity to U.S. equal protection law here, particularly because, at several
points, emphasis on concepts of non-discrimination is structurally similar to the text of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213 (2006). In particular, note that Article 2 and Article 3 of the Convention adopt
several terms which emerged earlier in Sections 12101 and 12111 of the ADA, such as
"reasonable accommodation."
12. See Convention, supra note 1. For a limited exception, note item 4, in Article 16.
13. See Programme, supra note 4; Convention, supra note 1, arts. 9, 19, 20. Many
contemporary disability rights advocates would likely approve of this linguistic shift; the term
rehabilitation can be understood as stigmatizing in the sense that the disabled person is the
object of state intervention (not coincidentally, using language also applied to criminality).
14. Convention, supra note 1. It should be acknowledged that at least some of the drive to
eliminate the term "prevention" from international disability law was likely rooted in
controversy over whether the term might implicate selective abortion.
15. See Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
16. With few exceptions I do not tackle empirical or documentary questions, related to
nation-state or NGO participation in the process of passing the Convention or attempt to
explore the history of the UN in relation to disability beyond textual analysis of these two
1572011]
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acknowledge an objection that some sectors within disability rights
movements and advocacy might raise: namely, that obviously the
prevention language was eliminated because it presumptively stigmatized
disability as something to be rid of, rather than focusing on structural and
social accessibility.17 Western disability historians note that in recent
decades, disability activists have fought very hard to advance the notion of
"disability pride" based on the idea that there is nothing inherently
negative about disability, other than the social and political barriers and
discrimination engendered by "ableism" or disability oppression.1 8 In this
sense, the elimination of prevention language can be interpreted as simply
a reflection of increasing sensitivity to the concerns and self-definitions
produced by disability communities.
I agree with this analysis to a point. My agenda certainly would not be
to call to reframe the UN Convention based on the goal of "eliminating" or
"stopping" disability, both terms evoked by the concept of "prevention." In
multiple respects, I embrace the critique that the term "prevention" has
been inherently problematic for the reasons identified in the previous
paragraph. In this one sense, I join the ranks of those scholars and
advocates who find the shift welcome and otherwise unremarkable. Some
adherents of the UN Convention might also highlight that the elimination
of prevention language represents a move from a "medical model" of
disability to a "social constructionist model."'19 In the latter model, the role
of societies in turning physical and mental variation into a basis for
exclusion or subordination is highlighted in understanding the experience
of "impairment." My emphasis on disability as an inflicted medical or
psychological harm could easily be misinterpreted as a simple regression to
a prior conception of disabilities as inherent tragedies located in bodies and
minds, rather than in the dynamic between individuals and social
structures. While I am deeply concerned with (inflicted) illness and injury
as medical realities, the distinction between the instant critique and a
traditional medical model lies in the emphasis on power and social
documents. This analysis would undoubtedly be enhanced by the inclusion of more "back
story," and archival research regarding the politics of the Convention's construction and
passage. Given time and space limitations, I have opted to limit the analysis in this Article
almost entirely to comparison of the two international legal documents in question relative to
their practical and ideological import, without fully historicizing or resolving the question of
how and why each came about.
17. The Convention was not solely imposed by the member states of the United Nations;
some disability advocates and communities were instrumentally involved in its production.
See, e.g., INCLUSION INTERNATIONAL, HEAR OUR VOICES 2, available at
http://www.dcdd.nl/reader/pdf/E/Brochure-Hear-Our-Voices.pdf ("[nlever before in the
history of the United Nations have people affected by a Convention been so intimately
involved in drafting it").
18. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993); PAUL K. LONGMORE, WHY I BURNED MY BOOK AND OTHER ESSAYS
ON DISABILITY (2003).
19. For background on disability advocates' move from medical to social constructions of
disability, see Liz Crow, Including All of Our Lives: Renewing the Socia! Model of Disability, in
ENcOUNTERS WITH STRANGERS 206 (Jenny Morris ed., 1996).
158 [Vol. 14
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structure (rather than genetic or divine inevitability) in creating medical
difference.
Moreover, my contention in this Article is more specific: I argue that
with the elimination of attention to disability prevention, international law
has also simultaneously vacated any analysis of disability that
acknowledges its social origins or enables recognition that power relations
have anything to do with the production of disabilities and not just the
treatment of people who are for whatever never-specified reason
"impaired." In order to make this argument, I will turn first to the fairly
recent literature within disability studies, which focuses on the concept of
"emergent disabilities." Part I of this Article discusses this literature and its
implications for an analysis of disability and power. In addition, I use this
section to attend to the relationship between medical institutions and law in
limiting conceptions of disability, the limits of equal protectionist
approaches to challenging disability subordination, and the perils and
prospects of associating disability and victimization. The second part of
this discussion returns specifically to the language of the Convention, with
continuing analytical comparison to the World Programme and to the
ADA. In this section, I draw from critical race and feminist legal theories in
order to delineate some of the implications of relying on an equality, or
equal protection, framework in advancing international law regarding
disability rights. I highlight differences in the conception of disability
relative to torture, race, poverty, gender, age, and economic vulnerability in
order to advance the argument that a human rights model patterned after
U.S. equal protectionist approaches to disability provides no adequate basis
to challenge the production of emergent disabilities. Finally, in the
conclusion, I discuss some of the implications of this analysis for disability
rights movement discourse, and lay out some very preliminary reflections
on potential directions for future legal advocacy, broadly, and relative to
the Convention.
II. TOWARDS AN ANALYSIS OF DISABLING OPPRESSION AND VIOLENCE
Western legal conceptions of disability frequently invoke several
specific ideological presumptions. First, disability is treated as an objective,
determinable medical fact.20  Disability historians have repeatedly
documented the construction of illness, deformity, and impairment as
contingent, shifting categories indicating the medicalization of gender,
sexuality, class, nationality, religion, race, and ethnicity.21 However,
contemporary recognition of disability by courts typically presumes a
value-neutral scientific basis underlying admittedly social dynamics of
20. See CLAIRE H. LIACHOWITZ, DISABILITIY AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: LEGISLATIVE RooTs
(1988).
21. See generally CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY: ESSAYS IN PIULOSOPHYr, POLITICS, POLICY AND
LAW (Dianne Pothier & Richard Devlin, eds., 2006).
2011] I59
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discrimination.22
Second, with regard to disability discrimination doctrine, or constructs
of equality, disability often appears to be without origin. In other words,
while disability-based subordination is recognized as a social phenomenon,
there is often no integrated political attention to why disability manifests in
particular individuals or communities73 As noted earlier, this applies to
the text of the Convention. This elision is noteworthy because in several
states domestic laws only recognize disabilities possessing an origin, when
the issue is, for instance, workers' compensation suits, personal injury law,
or medical malpractice. In fact, in these types of claims, the central legal
issue revolves around the origin of disability. That is, causing disability is
the basis for liability. Although the severity, longevity, meaning, or
demonstrable life impact of the disability may be relevant to arguments for
civil damages, the presumption that disability in this context is an
experience of inflicted harm remains largely unquestioned and un-
scrutinized. To clarify the point, disability often appears to function in two
regards: a) disability-as-identity, which under the auspices of international
human rights, civil rights, or equal protection doctrine, functions to
designate membership in a class of persons protected from discriminatory
treatment 24 or as beneficiaries of social welfare programs, and b) disability-
as-injury, usually a very individualized basis for a civil legal claim, whether
a tort or a claim grounded in some area of labor or health law.25 I further
suggest that the two conceptions of disability rarely appear to overlap in
law; they are implicitly constructed as distinct.
Third, while disability may function as a central element in the
assertion of rights or the establishment of a claim for compensation, it also
implicates a long social and legal history of stigma.26 To the extent that
societies and legal systems conceive of individuals and their rights in terms
of their measurable political and economic worth, the individual with a
disability is understood as damaged, and therefore devalued. 27 Marta
22. See Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn't 'Just Right': The Entrenchment of the
Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 INDIANA L. J. 181 (2008);
TRANSGENDER RIGHTS (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006).
23. This is for instance, typified by the Americans with Disabilities Act section 12102,
which defines disability as the presence of an impairment and never references cause, origin,
or presence. 42 U.S.C. § 12102.
24. See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006).
25. There are exceptions to the individualization of this type of civil claim; for instance, in
class actions where a group of people has been harmed by the negligence or actions of a
corporation, be it due to environmental toxins, manifesting harms from pharmaceutical side
effects, or any of a number of examples. However, unlike laws meant to address the issue of
equality, the issue is never membership in a class as broad as "disabled persons"; at most it
encompasses a group of individuals who share a fairly specific context or experience. Michael
Waterstone and Michael Stein also note that class actions in disability law, at least in the area
of civil rights claims in employment, have been drastically underused. See generally Michael
Stein & Michael Evan Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J.
861 (2006).
26. See TRANSGENDER RIGHTS, supra note 22.
27. See Marta Russell, Wh~at Disability Civil Rights Cannot Do: Employment & Political
160 [Vol. 14
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Russell notes that capitalist systems in particular, which conceive of human
labor as capital, tend to construct disabled bodies and minds as defective
and lacking economic worth - an assumption and ideology which then
infuses the social treatment of disabled populations.28  The disabled
individual, rather than having value, becomes a political or economic
burden on the state,29 or a social imposition on the public.30 In courts and
legal systems, I suggest that this devaluation often translates into a
perceived lack of credibility, or even basic competency to act as a legal
agent.
In this analysis, the conception of emergent disability constitutes an
opportunity to disrupt each of the three ideological presumptions detailed
here. The term "emergent disability" surfaced in social scientific research
as a descriptive term for a pattern of burgeoning mental and physical
conditions which correlate, often strongly, with poverty and various forms
of social and political subordination.31 In an analysis of poverty and
disability, Jennifer Pokempner and critical race theorist Dorothy Roberts
note that while these patterns are not actually new, the recognition of their
"emergence" poses a challenge to modes of medicine and policy that
systemically ignore the relationships between health and issues of social
justice or equity.32
For the purposes of this discussion, I conceive of emergent disability as
a subset of the broader term "disability," which refers specifically to
physical, cognitive, and/or psychological conditions which are wholly or
partially caused by social inequity. The basis for inequity may be grounded
in class and economics, gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity, immigration
status, age, or other disabilities, and often occurs at the intersection of
several of these demographics simultaneously. The events which generate
disabilities may derive from periods of extreme mass violence, systemic,
"ordinary" dynamics of medical, nutritional, or housing deprivation, labor
exploitation, safety or environmental hazards, criminal or medical
institutionalization, or interpersonal or domestic violence. The term
"emergent" disability is not a catch-all for every disability, in that it does
not necessarily include conditions which are solely genetic in origin,33 a
consequence of relatively normative aging processes, or of accident or




31. See generally Katherine Seelman & Sean Sweeney, The Changing Universe of Disability, 21
AM. REHABILITATION 2 (1995)
32. See Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy Roberts, Poverty Welfare Reform and the Meaning of
Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 425 (2001).
33. I qualify here that even genetic conditions may in some instances be socially
determined, for instance where genetic disorders result from radiation or toxin expusure, fruom
pharmaceuticals, or from long-term genetic adaptation to oppressive conditions. My point




Ribet: Emergent Disability and the Limits of Equality: A Critical Reading of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011
YALE HUMAN RIGHTS & DEVELOPMENT L.J.
circumstance which are not specifically indicative of subordination.
However, it is otherwise a broad umbrella term designating conditions
which - in the lives of particular individuals or communities - would not
be present, or would not be severe or significant, 'but-for' a context of
subordination or deprivation.
As already noted, the meaning of disability is often mutable and
relative, a fact that the Convention partially acknowledges. 34 Without
engaging here in a deeper discussion of the social construction of disability,
for the purposes of this discussion I am also distinguishing the term
"emergent disability" from the medicalization of social behaviors that are
not, in themselves, an impairment or an inherent experience of illness, pain,
or suffering.35 In other words, though the medicalization of deviance is
certainly an inter-related issue in any analysis of disability and
subordination, my focus here is specifically on disabilities which can be
understood as an inflicted experience of physical or mental/emotional
harm, suffering, or injury, which may engender but are not solely indicated
by social discrimination (i.e. ableism). Lastly, I make no attempt here to
quantify what proportion of people with disabilities may fall within this
subset. I know of no literature which does so broadly, though specific
studies document incidences of certain conditions or impairments along
demographic lines, particularly within broader literatures on health
disparities (though disability-framing is not always present in these
analyses). 36 However, my presumption in this Article is that the category of
emergent disabilities, as defined here, encompasses a very substantial
portion of disabled populations - likely at least a majority of those who are
not advanced in years. In other words, I am assuming that many, if not
most, impairments and health conditions that may be defined as disability
in young and middle-aged populations are caused, at least in substantial
34. See Convention, supra note 1, art II.
35. In using the term impairment here and in distinguishing it from the medicalization of
deviance, my purpose is certainly not to suggest that "impairments" are immutable, objective
experiences which would have comparable impacts regardless of the accessibility or hostility
of the context. The premise of universal design is that impairments can be as much a reflection
of an exclusive or inaccessible structure as of any other aspect of experience. I acknowledge
that experientially disabilities are complicated, and even with identical conditions, some
individuals will locate any experiences of suffering or loss in the social context while others
interpret the disability itself as the 'problem' or cause of any difficulties. My point here is not
to attempt to draw bright lines between "real" and "medicalized" disabilities or to attempt to
separate the experience of ableism from the experience of physical or mental disability. I am,
however, making use of the term "emergent disability," in this discussion, partly as an
indicator of disability which can not solely be understood as the medicalization of social
behavior. For an introduction to the sociological study of medicalization and deviance, see
PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH M. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO
SICKNESS (1992). See also Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability
Community, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 352 (2000) (offering a comparative discussion of
social versus medical models of disability).
36. See, e.g., Vickie M. Mays, Susan D. Cochran & Namdi W. Barnes, Race, Race Bused
Discrimination, and Health Outcomes Among African-Americans, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 201
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part, by systemic inequity and subordination.
As noted, various theorists have pointed to the utility of the concept of
emergent disability in disrupting the traditional notion that health issues
can be understood without attention to social justice issues.37 I propose that
a critical analysis of emergent disability poses a parallel and complex
challenge in the area of disability law. As discussed earlier, disability law
often operates to deploy and reinforce certain ideological presumptions: a)
belief in a reliable, objective medical science, b) the erasure of issues of
origin or cause of disability from the discourse when the issue is disability-
based discrimination and the corresponding separation of disability-as-
identity from disability-as-injury, and c) the association between disability
and lack of credibility or worth.
A. Challenging Medical and Scientific Neutrality
Social scientists and disability theorists have repeatedly documented
the use of medicine and science in rationalizing and reinforcing
subordination.38 Even a cursory exploration of the history of eugenics is
illustrative of this dynamic.39  The subject of emergent disabilities
intensifies and adds an additional dimension to this critique. Medicine and
science can certainly be understood as socially "disabling" in the sense that
they rationalize the deprivation of rights to people labeled disabled, where
the underlying basis for the label is a stereotype grounded in racial, gender,
sexual, class, or religious ideologies.40 In this kind of dynamic, medicine
plays a role in justifying a violation of rights or a loss of status by
establishing disability as stigma.
Histories of human experimentation (medical and psychiatric),41
nuclear testing involving intentional exposure of human beings to
radiation,42 medical campaigns intended to sterilize colonized populations
37. See Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 32; Melissa J. Mcneil & Thilo Kroll, Women and
Emerging Disabilities, in GENDERING DISABILITY 286, 286-93 (Bonnie G. Smith & Beth Hutchison
eds., 2004).
38. See CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 35; CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY, supra note 21.
39. See SHARON L. SNYDER & DAVID T. MITCHELL, CULTURAL LOCATIONS OF DISABILITY
(2005) (discussing the intersecting strands of disability, race, class, and gender woven into the
ideologies of eugenics, and the use of eugenic policies as a form of social control).
40. The U.S. constitutional law case Buck v. Bell is a classic illustration of this dynamic,
wherein the plaintiff, Carrie Buck, was forcibly sterilized based on a diagnosis of retardation.
Later interviewers repeatedly noted that she demonstrated normal intelligence. Aside from
highlighting the legal negligibility of the reproductive rights of people with disabilities, this
case also demonstrates how the nexus of poverty and gender can catalyze a stigmatizing
medical diagnosis. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
41. See, e.g., HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF
MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT
(2006) (discussing the politics and medical consequences of racialized human
experimentation).
42. See, e.g., STUDIES IN THEI ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC RIM (Sally M. Miller, A.J.H.
Lathum & Dennis 0. Flynn eds., 1998); JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE
AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (2002); ROBERT W. VENABLES,
2011] 163
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(for instance in Puerto Rico),43 or use of particular populations of women
and girls as 'guinea pigs' in reproductive pharmaceutical testing are all
indicative of a power relationship in which disablement is often the
outcome of abuse by a medical or scientific institution. In this dynamic,
medicine and science do not simply enable legal or political abuse; they are
the physical cause of disablement.
The increasing centrality of biological weaponry in contemporary
military/political discourse also syncs with this analysis. Disability
historian Paul Longmore, among others, has noted that the goal of warfare
is not framed solely in terms of killing the enemy. The purpose is to
"disable" the enemy, with the implicit message that disablement, whether
interpreted literally or metaphorically, is equivalent to defeat or to being
rendered powerless.44 It makes a particular kind of sense, therefore, that
medicine, which is the recognized basis for defining disability traditionally,
should be a tool or weapon used to cause it.
Peter A. Clark has noted that the role of medicine in contemporary
incidents of torture in warfare cannot be considered neutral or passive.4 5 In
his analysis of the role of military medical professionals in Abu Ghraib and
Guantanamo Bay, he argues that the role of medicine in breaking bodies
and minds has been integral to the praxis of torture.46 While chastising the
American Medical Association for its complicity in these incidents (out of
fear of antagonizing the Bush administration), he contends that the
construction of the medical profession as objective and detached serves to
mask the active role that medical practitioners play in human rights
violations.4 7  Scrutinizing the role of medicine relative to emergent
disabilities expands the critique beyond the definition of disabilities to its
active production. While the critique of medicalization certainly also poses
a challenge to the legal construction of medicine as objective and rightly
authoritative, recognizing the role of medicine in creating injury and harm
is particularly provocative, in that it reframes a site of neutral expertise as
one of perpetration. Consequently, it also raises questions about the
meaning and legitimacy of disability law, as an area of doctrine and
practice often deeply reliant on medical authority.
AMERICAN INDIAN HISTORY: FIVE CENTURIES OF CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE (2004).
43. See Maria Gonzalez et al., La Operacion: An Analysis of Sterilization in a Puerto Rican
Community in Connecticut, in WORK, FAMILY AND HEALTH: LATINA WOMEN IN TRANSITION 47
(Ruth E. Zambrana ed., 1982); Leon Luz, Sterilization and Depression: A Study of Puerto Rican
Women Living in New York (June 30, 1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham
University) (on file with UMI); ANNETTE B. RAMIREZ DE ARELLANO & CONRAD SEIPP,
COLONIALISM, CATHOLICISM, AND CONTRACEPTION: A HisTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL IN PUERTO
RICO (1983).
44. Paul Longmore, Lecture at the Inauguration of the UCLA Disability Studies Minor
(May 2007).
45. See Peter A. Clark, Medical Ethics at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib: The Problem of Dual
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B. Disablement and the Limits of Equal Protection Paradigms
The phenomenon of disability as an inflicted harm is both a primary
theme in this Article, and a central aspect of an analysis of emergent
disability. Relative to the second aspect of disability law discussed above,
namely the elision of the issue of causation or origin from anti-
discrimination or equal protection discourse, the question I pose here is:
why does this omission matter? After all, one might argue that in various
states, numerous areas of law exist to allow civil action against parties
responsible for inflicting injurious physical or psychological harm. And
certainly, there is a useful purpose in prohibiting certain kinds of civil or
human rights violations, whatever the origin of various disabilities. So
what limitations or problems are actually implicated by the treatment of
these areas of disability law as apparently distinct? I pose three responses
to this question: a) where an institution or party is simultaneously
responsible both for creating disability and engendering subsequent
difficulties and barriers which further compound that disability, a formalist
equal protection or anti-discrimination framework is an inadequate basis
from which to generate actual accountability and meaningful remedies, b)
the separation of the origin of disability from other areas of disability rights
has a de-historicizing and de-politicizing effect in public and legal
discourse, and c) related to the prior two points, where the social origins of
disability are obscured, it becomes very difficult to make claims for
reparation which transcend individuals or a single generation. While the
psychological and medical consequences of mass events like genocide,
slavery, or geographic dislocation may manifest for many generations, 48
"disability rights" are rarely conceived of in comparable collective or trans-.
generational terms.
To explore the first point, I look to the example of prison systems,
particularly in the United States.49 The disproportionate presence of people
with disabilities among the incarcerated is acknowledged.5 0 This trend is
generally attributed to deinstitutionalization, meaning specifically the
expulsion of mental health patients from treatment facilities and the
corresponding criminalization of the mentally ill.51 Given the strong
48. See generally CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN CHILD AND ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH (M.
Elena Garralda & Jean-Philippe Raynaud eds., 2008).
49. I am focusing on the United States here primarily because I am most familiar with U.S.
prison law and systems. However it should also be noted that the United States has been
strongly critiqued by the United Nations for human rights violations in prisons and jails, and
therefore constitutes an appropriate context for this discussion. See Committee Against
Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention,
Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CU12 (May 18, 2006).
50. See LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEFF.
OF JUSTICE, NCJ 181644, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF INMATES, 1997 (2001); TERRY KUPERS, PRISON
MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND BARS AND WHAT WE MUST DO ABOUT IT (1999).
51. MARUSCHAK ET AL., supra note 50; KUPERS, supra note 50.
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correlation between disability and poverty,5 2 and between poverty, race
and incarceration,53 the disproportionate presence of disabled persons in
penal institutions is both intuitive and initially, though minimally
documented.54  Disability advocates have further noted a pattern of
dramatic early incarceration of learning disabled urban children and youth
of color in juvenile hall facilities, with predictable outcomes in terms of later
adult incarceration.55
When the Americans with Disabilities Act was passed, several prison
officials actively resisted the application of the federal legislation in prison
systems, resulting in a series of court battles which were finally resolved by
the U.S. Supreme Court in 1998 in the Yeskey decision.56 Since the Supreme
Court definitively stated that prisons and jails are institutions within the
meaning of the ADA,57 prisoner rights advocates have a new prospect for
challenging prison conditions which extends beyond the traditional
limitations of constitutional Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Although it
would be naive to suggest that the ADA has or will have any rapidly
drastic transformative effect in the prison system given the existence of
various barriers to effective prisoner litigation58 and given the limitations
on the impact of the ADA in other arenas, 59 the concept of disability civil
rights now has some substantive legal foundation relative to prisons,
essentially for the first time in U.S. history.
The application of the ADA in prisons primarily manifests relative to
accessibility of existing facilities and resources, and the prohibition of overt
52. Programme, supra note 4.
53. See generally Andrew S. London & Nancy A. Myers, Race, Incarceration & Health: A Life-
Course Approach, 28 RESEARCH ON AGING 409 (2006).
54. KUPERS, supra note 48. The U.S. Congress also acknowledged the disproportionate
incarceration of people with disabilities in the United States, in the preamble to the Prison
Rape Elimination Act (PREA). Prison Rape Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15601 (2006).
55. See Learning Rights Law Center, http://www.leamingrights.org/ (last visited June 23,
2009).
56. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
57. Id.
58. Aside from issues of economic resources and high rates of illiteracy, prisoners wishing
to file ADA claims must still overcome the barriers set by the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
which makes it exceptionally difficult for prisoners to engage in litigation, particularly relative
to prison conditions. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat.
1321 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). For
analysis of the PLRA, see Cindy Chen, Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Doing Away with
More than Just Crunchy Peanut Butter, 78 ST. JOHNS. L. REv 203 (2004); John Boston, Legal Aid
Society, The Prison Litigation Reform Act (Prepared for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
Staff Attorneys' Orientation, 2004), http://www.wnylc.net/pb/ docs/plra2cir04.pdf (last
visited June 4, 2011).
59. See generally Linda Hamilton Krieger, Backlash Against the Americans with Disabilities
Act: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. OF
EMPLOYMENT & LABOR L. 1 (2001); BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: REINTERPRETING DISABILITY
RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003). It should be acknowledged that since the more
recent passage of the Amendment to the Americans with Disabilities Act one part of Krieger
and her colleagues' critique - namely the severe restrictions on what constitutes disability for
the purposes of applying the ADA - has been mitigated. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008,
42 U.S.C.A. § 12101 (2010).
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and extreme discriminatory treatment.60 However, as disability advocates
Marta Russell and Jean Stewart maintain:
The harshness of prison life disables people. Inadequate or absent
medical care, poor nutrition, violence, and extremes of heat, cold,
and noise inside prison, not to mention lack of sensory, emotional,
intellectual, and physical stimuli, all lead directly to acute and
chronic physical and psychological disabilities.
Prison overcrowding accelerates the disabling process. Humans
who are packed into spaces designed for one-third the number of
people actually residing in them are bound to find themselves in
more frequent, and more disabling, violent confrontations. 61
Although U.S. courts have acknowledged certain extreme aspects of
prison conditions as "cruel and unusual," they have repeatedly emphasized
deference to prison administrators in determining the norms and practices
surrounding prison function and structure.62 In practice, cruelty, even with
permanently disabling or injurious consequences, does not necessarily
equate to an Eighth Amendment violation. The usual or normative
practices of the prison may be both lawful domestically, and yet predictably
and severely disabling. The Supreme Court has gone so far as to
acknowledge the potential infliction of psychiatric disability and physical
confrontation as an acceptable aspect of punishment.63 Justice Rehnquist's
dismissal of these forms of disablement is best summed up in his opinion in
Atiyeh v. Capps: "nobody promised them a rose garden; and I know of
nothing in the Eighth Amendment which requires that they be housed in a
manner . . . likely to avoid confrontations, psychological depression, and
the like."64
These illustrations alone could readily yield the critique that the ADA
is not comprehensive enough to address all the needs and concerns which
are critical to people with disabilities, since its emphases are on the
reception that disability receives when already present, and not on the
process of disablement. Past and recent court decisions make clear that
prisoner attempts to utilize the ADA based on any broader conception of
rights to health or well-being will fail.65 Where the issue is a disabling
60. See, e.g., Montez v. Romer, 32 F.Supp.2d 1235 (D.Colo. 1999).
61. Marta Russell & Jean Stewart, Disablement, Prison and Historical Segregation, 53
MONTHLY REV., 61, 72 (2001).
62. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (establishing deference to penal
administrators as a primary, though not exclusive, priority of the court).
63. See Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312 (1981).
64. Id. at 1315-16.
65. See, e.g., Benyamini v. Manjuano, No. 1:06-cv-01096-AWI-NEW (DLB), 2007 WL
2580548 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (holding that the ADA is meant to address "discriminatory" treatment
- meaning in this instance, whether disabled inmates are singled out and treated more harshly
- and does not extend to any right to be spared further disablement due to prison conditions,
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medical condition, courts sometimes appear to be reluctant even to
acknowledge the issue of disability for equal protection purposes, reverting
instead to the argument that prisoners are not a protected class, and that the
issue is the delivery of like treatment with other inmates. 66 In sum, in an
extreme context where continuing disablement is a structural norm in
which those who are not already disabled become so through exposure to
the institution, framing disability rights in terms of "equal treatment"
becomes virtually meaningless, because there is no normative basis for
positive treatment upon which to ground a discrimination claim.
Moreover, there is a particularly troubling implication embedded in the
premise that it can be lawful to break or injure people, and the only
question is how far one can then lawfully go in discriminating further
against the injured as such.67
It could be argued that this critique is limited to the context of prisons,
and while it may be otherwise worthwhile to argue against human rights
violations, the fact that those violations are also disabling is not really a
critique of disability law, but rather of the court's interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment, and of the poor status of human rights in U.S. prisons.
I readily concede that prisons are a comparatively extreme context
generating a high proportion of emergent disabilities, and in this instance,
its victims are literally confined by its boundaries. There is nevertheless a
broader relationship and analogy to other areas of the state's relationships
to individual persons and communities. The critical point here is that
where the state is already generating disability in systemic ways within
particular communities, having some limited right to continue to live or
access institutions after the fact is useful, but poses no fundamental
challenge to violent or oppressive disablement, and therefore cannot realize
meaningful equity. This argument can apply, for instance, to systemic
poverty, labor exploitation, gender-based violence, and the historical and
ongoing dynamics endemic to white supremacy and imperialism. For
or to access medical care to prevent that disablement).
66. See Dotson v. Wilson, 477 F. Supp. 2d 838 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
67. Of course this point resonates with broader critiques of formalist equal protection
doctrine, for instance, as articulated by critical race theorists. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RAcisM AND AMERICAN LAW (2000). My purpose in making the link to critical race scholars
such as Bell is not to collapse the issues of disability and race, as the legal treatment of the two
categories is not identical, particularly relative to the distinction between strict scrutiny and
rational basis review, and the more presumptive acceptance of a medical conception of
disability as opposed to race (though certainly race can still be medicalized). However, the
congruence is also important to note, particularly since a common theme between the two
cases becomes evident when considering the emphasis on like treatment, as opposed to
substantive equity or freedom from harm. And of course the categories, disability and race,
are also not clearly distinct or separable, particularly in prisons where I contend that the
dynamics of incarceration involve intense intersectional subordination based on disability and
race, often coupled with class, gender, sexuality, and age. See KUPERS, supra note 50
(acknowledging, for instance, the mental health consequences of racism in U.S. prisons); Beth
Ribet, Naming Prison Rape as Disablement: A Critical Analysis of the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Imperatives of Survivor-Oriented Advocacy, 17 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 281 (2010).
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example, recent scholarship details the infliction of nearly pandemic rates
of post-traumatic stress and related medical deterioration among
Palestinian populations in the occupied territories.68 Even if access to social
services and health care were meaningful or adequate in this context (and it
is not), 69 the core problem - that the occupation of Palestine is generating
massive injury and illness - would not be remedied.
To respond to the second argument, I turn to the next part of my
analysis. Again, I contend that treating disability without regard to origin
has a de-historicizing and de-politicizing effect in social and legal
discourse. In order to explore this contention, it is useful to consider the
concept of "reasonable accommodation," which is central to the operation
of the ADA, and to the language of the Convention, though it was not
originally present in the World Programme. 70 The ADA's definition of
"reasonable accommodation" is interpreted contingently, relative to the
concept of "undue hardship." Undue hardship or burden arguments are
assessed based on a multi-factor test considering the nature of the
accommodation, economic expense or other impact of the proposed
accommodation, the size and nature of the facility or covered entity called
upon to accommodate, and its economic resources.? The reasonableness of
an accommodation rests on its relationship to these factors, and the statute
acknowledges no others. I note here that the culpability of the employer or
entity in the production of the disability itself is not conceived within the
terrain of the law, when considering or weighing what its burden should
be. So, under the terms of the ADA, employees who are, for instance,
disabled by working conditions may nevertheless subsequently be deemed
too burdensome to employ for economic reasons. Of course, employees
who are disabled in the workplace may conceivably, where domestic laws
allow, pursue a separate action for workers compensation and/or in
various areas of tort law. As previously noted, there are other areas of law
meant to address disability-as-injury, or disability as an inflicted harm.
What is noteworthy here is that it is not necessarily wrongful, or,
discriminatory to disable an employee and then fire her/him. The critical
question is whether accommodating the disability is a hardship under
terms which are not weighted based on, and do not acknowledge, the
disability's origin. In a legal system and economic context that could be
described as egalitarian, it could be argued that there is no real problem.
Labor laws and normative economic practices would guard against careless
or casual harm to workers and thoroughly compensate those who, despite
68. See Raija-Leena Punamaki et al., The Role of Peritraumatic Dissociation and Gender in the
Association Between Trauma and Mental Health in a Palestinian Community Sample, 162 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 545 (2005); Dima Qato, The Politics of Deteriorating Health: The Case of Palestine, 34:2
INT'L J. OF HEALTH SERvIcEs 341, 358-59 (2004).
69. Qato, supra note 68, at 358-59.
70. See Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006); Convention, supra note 1;
Programme, supra note 4.
71. Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. 5 12111 (2006).
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an equitable and well-functioning structure by some aberrant circumstance,
were still harmed. My contention here, however, is a critique of
contemporary disability law within a context historically and continuously
attenuated by inequity. The concept of "reasonable accommodation,"
essentially interpreted within a paradigm of formal equality, frames the
responsibilities of states, entities, and institutions as if they only ever begin
after disability already exists, or as noted, as if the origin of disability is
irrelevant. 72 The history of interaction between the state or a particular
institution and the communities in which disabilities occur has no
substantive legal bearing on whether accommodation is too expensive or
unduly burdensome. If the accommodation were reframed as a remedy or
reparation, it would be easier to argue for changes, even for expensive,
dramatic ones, provided they are responsive to emergent disabilities that
are comparably drastic or costly in terms of their impact on the individuals
who experience them. In contrast, when origin is ignored or treated as
irrelevant, the social narrative of disability loses its historical context.
To further illustrate the salience of this point, it is helpful to consider a
hypothetical company in which employees work under physically
demanding and tiring conditions. In this imagined scenario, workplace
injuries that are immediately and totally incapacitating are rare; in other
words, "workplace safety" is relatively high. Given this fact there is little
legal basis for worker's compensation claims.73 However, over time,
employees suffer high rates of heart disease, joint or muscular problems
associated with fatigue, and other conditions associated with overwork.74
As they become increasingly disabled, they must quit or are dismissed due
to unfitness or lack of qualification for the work. The odds of successfully
mounting an individual or class action lawsuit on the grounds that the
company is working employees too hard seem slim to the extent that they
exist at all. Under the ADA, employees might try to make a claim that they
should be accommodated by receiving substantially reduced or altered
workloads.75 However, the "undue hardship" argument would be a fairly
easy defense here: this kind of accommodation is likely to be costly, 76 and
72. Id. (providing definitions of "reasonable accommodation," absent any
acknowledgement of how the cause of disability may affect institutional or employer
"burden").
73. A few workers' rights collectives have attempted to advance worker's compensation
claims based on the health and stress consequences of overwork, though this type of claim is
still uncommon in the United States. See, e.g., Canadian Union of Public Employees, Health and
Safety and Workload: An Onslaught of Overwork Is Breaking CUPE Backs (Feb. 5, 2001 12:54PM),
http://cupe.ca/workload/Health-andsafety-an.
74. See generally JOHN DE GRAAF, TAKE BACK YOUR TIME: FIGHTING OVERWORK & TIME
POVERTY IN AMERICA (2003); JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN: THE UNEXPECTED
DECLINE OF LEISURE (1993).
75. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Tit. 1 (2006). It bears noting that the ADA
text is explicit about the legitimacy of part-time scheduling as a legitimate form of
accommodation.
76. 1 am assuming for the purposes of the hypothetical here that employees have some
form of medical and/or other benefits - in which case employer expense is higher whether
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still may not be viable relative to the work. In essence, the company can
use up able-bodied workers and throw away the disabled for generations,
without running afoul of disability discrimination law and while
maintaining the semblance of being a non-discriminatory employer. Both
within and outside of employment contexts, the framing of disability as a
personal diagnosis or experience for which no one (else) is responsible
ensures that the communities who disproportionately experience
disablement will remain without meaningful recourse. It begs
acknowledgement here, again, that emergent disabilities are not, for
instance, race, gender, or class neutral.77 In sum, disability discrimination
law is structured in terms which are not likely to either recognize or
remedy the histories of racial or ethnic, class, gender, sexual, age, or
religious subordination which underlie emergent disabilities.
Lastly, it bears noting that conceiving of disability in terms that belie or
obscure origin implicitly limits the potential reach of war crimes tribunals
and reparations in the international arena. To explicate this point, it is
critical to comprehend disablement as a communal process, in which
psychological and physical trauma, poverty, and even genetic mutations or
adaptations consequent to biological warfare become familial legacies. One
of the more developed psychiatric literatures in this area specifically
documents the transmission of trauma and related health issues in children
of Holocaust survivors.78 My own research with daughters of survivors of
the Shoah has yielded narratives about increased susceptibility to eating
disorders (stenming from parental starvation experiences), inherited post-
traumatic stress, depression, and other stress-related conditions.79 The
complexity of "reparation" for the kinds of physically-entrenched harm
created by genocide, colonization, or slavery is attenuated by the fact that
the consequences are only partially predictable, and can play out for
centuries.
Although some cultural rights advocates attempt to frame the issue of
reparations based on a trans-temporal understanding of collective harm,80
the praxis of war crime reparations generally conceives of injury based on
the experiences of individuals in a particular historical moment.81
Reparations are allocated and distributed, usually to individuals,82 based on
employees receive full-time wages for less work or are reduced to part-time, which increases
the number of requisite employees receiving benefits. Of course this is not to suggest that
benefits are normatively a foregone conclusion within either domestic or transnational
economies.
77. Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 32, at 425.
78. See DINA WARDI, MEMORIAL CANDLES: CHILDREN OF THE HOLOCAUST (1992).
79. See Beth Ribet, Memory, Generation, and Post-War Identities: Jewish Daughters of
Holocaust Survivors in the United States (2005) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California-
Irvine).
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that initial injury, often without any requisite consciousness or
compensation for the consequences of those harms for subsequent
generations. Consequently, even where reparations are secured, they may
not actually restore or make substantive contributions to ensure health,
cultural autonomy, access to resources, or strong communal infrastructures.
Again, emergent disabilities often remain personal problems or concerns.
As such, they are typically outside the terrain of social accountability or
historical recognition in law and other areas of social discourse. Where
medical diagnoses run in families, the chances of recognizing a major social
or historical origin are even less likely; genetic or biologically transmitted
conditions are presumed to be free from social influence. 83
To recap, a disability civil rights or equal protection paradigm rooted in
a formalist notion of equality suffers from at least three problems. First, in
treating the issue of disability's cause or origin as distinct from other
attached civil rights, it fails to generate meaningful remedies or hold
institutions adequately accountable for violent disablement. Second, it
constructs a narrative in which responsibility for the presence of disability
is squarely and solely located outside of institutions culpable for
accommodation, and thereby frames the marginalization and sacrifice of
disabled people as socially and economically reasonable. In the process, it
obscures the broader racial, gender, class, religious, age and sexual
dynamics of subordination which contribute to disablement. Third, and
finally, it relies on a construct of disability that is individualized and does
not lend itself to a deeper analysis of communal disablement in the context
of warfare, genocide, and related mass human rights violations. An
implicit issue in this discussion is that emergent disability, by its existence,
indicates a victim-perpetrator dynamic that is the basis for and origin of
disability. An equal protection paradigm recognizes an aspect of this
dynamic, in the sense that individuals with disabilities may be the targets
of discrimination on the basis of disability. But as already noted, this
analysis is partial and de-historicized. It follows that centering emergent
disability reframes the issue of who individuals with disabilities are, and
therefore, creates meaningful implications with respect to the legal and
social stigma attached to disability.
C. The Challenge of Victim Visibility
The association between disability and incompetence, and disability
and unworthiness, is well-documented, and deeply entrenched.84 Courts
have repeatedly indicated strong adherence to both preconceptions.8 5 I
suggest that acknowledgement of emergent disability implicates a potential
83. See Elizabeth Ettorre, A Critical Look at the New Genetics: Conceptualizing the Links
Between Reproduction, Gender and Bodies, 12 CRITICAL PUB. HEALTH 237 (2002).
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to disrupt these stereotypes, though not without risk. Claiming and
naming emergent disability requires acknowledging that a particular
disability is evidence of some form of oppression, that the disabled person
is a victim of that oppression, and that there are perpetrator(s) who are
responsible for the victimization and the resulting disability. In other
words, one way to understand emergent disability is that it designates a
person who has been victimized and therefore is a victim. To say that such
an assertion is loaded or politically charged is likely an understatement.
On the one hand, the association between disability and victimization is
fairly synchronous with images and ideas of disability as tragic and
pathetic.86 Disability communities and advocates have reacted to this
ideology by working strenuously to disassociate disability from any
negative experience or schema other than that imposed by structural and
psychological disability discrimination.87  Intentionally asserting that
disability is an experience of being damaged by victimization, at least
apparently, runs counter to this kind of advocacy and may easily be used to
reinforce mainstream negative associations between disability, damage,
and weakness - all intersecting evidence of supposed inferiority. In
addition, many feminist scholars have explored the perils of the label
victim" in the context of any bid for empowerment or credibility,88 and the
tendency to reduce anyone labeled a victim to a status of total social and
political powerlessness, incompatible with the exercise of agency.
Nevertheless, there are at least two prospective reasons to consider
asserting a relationship between disability and victimization more
explicitly. First, relative to the previous discussion, from a legal
perspective, it appears to be a necessary step in pushing disability advocacy
and rights beyond the limits of formalist equal protection doctrine.
Naming disability as victimization attributes responsibility to institutions
and their representatives for a higher degree of reparation or remedy than
can be expected under the contemporary praxis of "reasonable
accommodation." 89 As noted, this already happens in areas of law dealing
with what I term disability-as-injury. The critical intervention here is an
incorporation of analysis of victimization into domestic disability civil
rights and international human rights laws. Second, and perhaps most
86. Dana Lee Baker, Autism as a Public Policy, in CRITICAL DISABILITY THEORY, supra note 21,
at 177-78.
87. SHAPIRO, supra note 17.
88. See, e.g., Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and
Colonial Discourses, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM (Chandra Talpade
Mohanty, Ann Russo & Lourdes Torres eds., 1991) 51, 51-52 (analyzing the colonizing
consequences of western feminists imposing a monolithic victim narrative on non-western
women and girls); See generally Elizabeth M. Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of
Victimization and Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 387 (1993).
89. The concept of reasonable accommodation, both in U.S. civil rights praxis, and in the
Convention, is conceived of as a form of non-discriminatory treatment, rather than as a
reparative or remedial measure in which the state is presumed to have already caused harm.
See Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006); Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.
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critically from the perspective of shifting ideological discourse, framing
disability as the result of a victim-perpetrator dialectic helps to reveal the
stake that institutional perpetrators may have in discrediting or devaluing
the disabled/victim. In other words, disability stigma (or ideological
ableism) may be understood as a form of "victim-blame." I suggest that as
long as disability is taken as evidence of individual unworthiness or
weakness, whether the response evoked is pity or contempt, the "blame"
for disability, and the shame associated with it, are implicitly located in the
disabled. Ideally at least, naming emergent disability as victimization or
oppression can potentially shift blame back onto the perpetrator, with the
effect of de-stigmatizing the status of being a person who has been disabled
by violence and oppression.
Of course as noted, advancing this kind of discursive shift is as likely to
trigger a whole set of stereotypes associated with oppression and
victimization. If, for instance, as discussed earlier, an ideological goal of
warfare is to "disable" the enemy,90 the state party responsible for
disablement may freely acknowledge that disabilities are the consequence
of violence, but may defend them as deserved or acceptable. Whether
disability occurs in any of the intersecting contexts of patriarchal discipline,
capitalist profit, or imperial conquest and domination, it cannot be
presumed that courts or popular discourse will understand the victim as
either blameless or worthy of respect. Even without further examples or
exploration, this point can be inferred from the controversies that emerge
over the meanings of racial, gender, sexual, ethno-religious, age-based, or
class-based violence and victimization.91
The task of carefully analyzing the factors I have briefly introduced in
this section, and weighing them from a strategic perspective, is beyond the
scope of this discussion. Although this Article certainly argues for the
incorporation of emergent disability analysis into legal doctrine, my
purpose in this section is primarily to acknowledge that doing so will not
be without potential pitfalls, which will have to be navigated with some
care. To avoid degenerating into the replication of ableist stereotypes, the
process of facilitating emergent disability claims and discourse will require
rigorous attention to the meanings we attribute to oppression and
victimization, and the interplay between dynamics of class, race, ethnicity,
religion, gender, sexuality, age, and, of course, disability.
III. EMERGENT DISABILmES AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW:
APPLYING FEMINIST AND CRITICAL RACE THEORIES
Although the literature on emergent disabilities is growing,92 its
90. Longmore, supra note 44.
91. See Schneider, supra note 88; KuM-KUM BHAVNANI, FEMINISM & 'RACE' (2001); LINDA
WILLIAMS, PLAYING ri-i RACE CARD: MELODRAMAS OF BLACK AND WHITE FROM UNCLE TOM rO
O.J. SIMPSON (2002).
92. The terminology dates back to the 1990s, and is still not widely referenced in disability
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application in virtually any area of legal theory is still in a nascent stage.93
For this reason, Part I of this Article is mostly foundational, laying out some
initial contributions to what I hope, in time, will be a broader and much
better developed legal theoretical literature addressing emergent disability,
power, and claims-making. In this Part, I apply some of the critical
framework I have mapped out to the Convention, looking specifically at the
Convention's approach to poverty and race, its similarity to U.S. domestic
equal protection doctrine, and again, its variance from its precedent, the
World Programme. I argue that the Convention largely syncs with the
broader critiques articulated in Part I, relative to: a) de-historicizing
disability, b) failing to recognize its intersectional nature with other
dynamics of subordination, and c) providing little basis for meaningful
challenges to mass violence in particular moments or transcending
generations.
The World Programme on Disability framed the relationship
between poverty and disability in these terms:
Much disability could be prevented through measures taken
against malnutrition, environmental pollution, poor hygiene,
inadequate prenatal and postnatal care, water-borne diseases and
accidents of all types. The international community could make a
major breakthrough against disabilities caused by poliomyelitis,
tetanus, whooping-cough and diphtheria, and to a lesser extent
tuberculosis, through a world-wide expansion of programmes of
immunization. 94
The Programme further goes on to detail a proposed relationship
between humanitarian efforts, what it terms "mass disability" as a
consequence of warfare, and racism as a cause of warfare:
In many countries, the prerequisites for achieving the purposes of
the Programme are economic and social development, extended
services provided to the whole population in the humanitarian
area, the redistribution of resources and income and an
improvement in the living standards of the population. It is
necessary to use every effort to prevent wars leading to
devastation, catastrophe and poverty, hunger, suffering, diseases
and mass disability of people, and therefore to adopt measures at
all levels to strengthen international peace and security, to settle all
international disputes by peaceful means and to eliminate all
forms of racism and racial discrimination in countries where they
studies or public health literatures, much less in law.
93. For one of the very few legal analyses which incorporate the terms, see Pokempner &
Roberts, supra note 32 (discussing the significance of emergent disability in understanding
links between race, gender, and welfare reform).
94. Programme, supra note 4.
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still exist.95
It should be acknowledged that the conception of disability here is in
many respects a medical one, both in its presumption about the nature of
disability, and the prioritized response to it. Many race-conscious
advocates and scholars will challenge the framing of racism and racial
discrimination as in multiple contexts, a past phenomenon, as implicated in
the phrasing: "where they still exist." However, it is also very striking here
that the United Nations is acknowledging social origin, if not social
construction of disability, and is essentially identifying racism as a cause of
disablement, and therefore, anti-racism as a necessary remedy to prevent it.
In contrast, the words "race" and "racial" each appear only once in the UN
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and are limited to
the preamble, rather than to any of the specific planks intended to generate
state action or accountability.96 In considering the disappearance of race
and racism from international disability law, it is helpful to turn to critical
race theory, in order to scrutinize both the relationship between race and
disability, and the salience of framing in this instance. I also contend that a
careful explication of the dynamic requires consideration of class and of
gender (and sexuality) in both texts.
A. Acknowledging Critical Perspectives on Law, Collectivity, and
Identity
In formulating my comparative critique of the UN Convention and the
World Programme, I draw on the critical race feminist conception of
"intersectionality," particularly as embodied in the seminal work of
Kimberle Crenshaw.97  Crenshaw's framing of the term has been
interpreted, applied, and expanded across disciplines, and is often
employed primarily as a critique of identity-based essentialism.98 Although
Crenshaw's work is certainly a strong illustration that simplistic or
monolithic identity categories are inadequate and flawed, I note that a
careful reading of her work yields additional critical premises. For
instance, in Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race & Sex: A Black Feminist
95. Id.
96. Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
97. See Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 139; Kimberl Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, & Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). Crenshaw's original conception of
intersectionality references the intersection of identities (particularly race and gender), the
specific dynamics of subordination produced at the intersection of vulnerabilities, and both the
misrecognition and erasure of intersecting discrimination claims by legal systems.
98. See Rangita de Silva de Aiwis, Mining the Intersections: Advancing the Rights of Women
and Children with Disabilities within an interrelated Web of Human Rights, 18 PAC. RIM. L. & POL'Y
J. 293 (2009) (providing an example of this kind of partial/anti-essentialist framework as
applied to the issue of disability intersectionality).
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Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory & Anti-Racist Politics,
Crenshaw contends that the consequence of intersectional vulnerability
results in the specific persecution of identity groups who are experiencing
compounded and intersectional subordination - in this analysis, African
American women workers. 99 Moreover, her analysis of the attempts of
African American women to obtain class certification for class action
litigation reveals a disturbing dynamic. Where identities and experiences
of subordination are intersectional, the law does not simply fail to provide
an adequate remedy and/or to enable equitable and appropriate
consideration of the circumstances. In the more drastic instances, the
experience of subordination simply cannot be articulated at all within the
confines of legal process. In other words, intersectional experiences may
fall entirely outside legal framing, or may be at best partially cognizable or
disjointed, with perilous prospects for advocacy.
Moving for a moment back to the domain of disability legal
scholarship, it is striking here that, as Waterstone and Stein contend, class
certification is often also unavailable or underutilized in disability law, due
to a strict judicial interpretation of group identity, originating in racial class
certification interpretations.100  When considered in tandem, the two
critiques highlight recognition of the frequent incapacity of law to both
acknowledge and accommodate difference, while also enabling collective
mobilization. Feminist international legal theorist Hilary Charlesworth
makes a synchronous point, calling for feminist attention to the "complex
structures of domination that affect women differently," but also
acknowledging the frequent challenge of doing so in more than a cursory
fashion. 0 1 This critique is echoed by Johanna Bond, who contends that
international human rights law suffers from an inability to conceive of
women's experiences in terms fully cognizant of intersectional harm and
vulnerability.102 I would intervene in these critiques only to add that even
the category "women" in some respects marks a limited conception of
female subordination, as it presumes adult subjectivity, and rarely fully
conceives of the human rights of girls.
Multiple critical race theorists have also repeatedly and rigorously
delineated the subordinating consequences of the fiction of "race-neutral"
and/or so-called "colorblind" legal construction. 0 3 Although this rhetoric
is not always synonymous with the failure to conceive of intersectionality,
it is certainly an integrated dynamic. In the former instance, demographics,
99. Crenshaw, supra note 97.
100. Stein & Waterstone, supra note 25.
101. Hilary Charlesworth, Martha Nussbaum's Feminist Internationalism, 111 ETHICS 64, 76
(2000).
102. See Johanna E. Bond, International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic
Exploration of Women's International Human Rights Violations, 52 EMORY L.J. 71 (2003).
103. See, e.g., Bell, supra note 68; Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-
Blind," in KIMBERLE CRENSH-AW FT AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT
FORMED THE MOVEMENT 257-275 (1995); See generally CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 2001).
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including race, may be acknowledged, but poorly deployed and constituted
relative to the complexity of identities and experience,104 and in the latter,
race is ignored entirely, or reduced to a formalist conception of
discrimination, acknowledging subordination only as the recognition of
difference.105 In both instances, the possibility for engaging subordination
productively through law is deeply compromised, or at times wholly
negated.
B. Equalization and Globalization
In applying the arguments presented above to the construction of the
UN Convention, I will advance five points. First, as indicated, I argue that
when the text of the Convention and the World Programme are compared,
the former is less responsive to at least some of the needs of people with
emergent disabilities. In order to make this case, I revisit the meaning of
emergent disabilities and look at the issue of torture, warfare, and again,
poverty as conceived in both documents. Second, I argue that while some
elements of an intersectional frame are present in the Convention, it
represents a regression when compared to the World Programme,
particularly where intersectionality is not solely conceived of as a
disruption of essentialist identity constructs. In making this claim, I focus
on the issue of gender, age, and to some extent poverty. Third, continuing
the theme of intersectionality, I contend that the Convention embodies an
erosion of race-consciousness from international disability law. Fourth, I
submit that all three of these previous points are consistent with the
internationalization of a conception of equality most consistent with
existing U.S. equal protection frameworks. Fifth, I propose that
contemporary and historical economic and political globalization
represents intensely and relentlessly strenuous incidence of mass
disablement of populations. Therefore, the realignment of international
disability law with a comparatively western, formalist conception of
equality should be alarming to and occasioning more scrutiny from critical
disability, critical race, and feminist legal theorists and advocates.
Before delving explicitly into comparative hermeneutics, it is useful
to revisit my analysis in Part I. In addition to advancing any precise
critique of this moment in international/ disability law, or contributing to
broader feminist and critical race literatures challenging formalist equality
constructs, a central aspect of my analytical and political agenda lies in
troubling the meaning of "disability rights." In part, my task is to move
from an antidiscrimination model of disability rights, to a more substantive
anti-subordination framework, very much in the tradition of both feminist
and critical race theoretical critiques of the precepts of domestic equal
protection and constitutional doctrine. However, whether understood as a
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supplement to or a part of this anti-subordination frame, my agenda is also
to explicitly conceive of "disability rights" or social justice for people with
disabilities in terms which are not limited solely to freedom from
maltreatment as people with disabilities. This alternative disability social
justice paradigm will necessarily be historicized and responsive to any
harm or subordination which is - in its consequence or manifestation -
physically, mentally, or otherwise disabling. In this sense, emergent
disability rights implicate the needs of any vulnerable or subordinated
population, particularly at the intersections of race, gender, class, sexuality,
culture, age, ethnicity, and existing disabilities.
I do not, in this Article, attempt to carefully engage the much larger
task of thinking how, in doctrine or practice, such a disability legal
framework would be constituted, at least in all its specificities. The critical
point here is that the needs of people with emergent disabilities are not
limited to needs, rights, or concerns people have related to the continuing
social and legal treatment of existing disability vis-A-vis discrimination or
even a broader conception of ongoing ableist subordination. I am instead
delineating at least two other concerns: a) the prospects and components of
reparation, remedy, or healing individuals (and communities) have while
and after being disabled by violence and/or subordination (currently un- or
under-realized in other civil rights or welfare models as they exist), and b) a
kind of collective or cultural (disability) right that populations subject to
subordination have not to be harmed in the first place. The latter is
particularly different from current conceptions of disability rights, which
are limited to legal subjects legally constituted as a discrete (disabled)
population, supposedly distinguishable from everyone else. 106 Rather, it
presupposes a right that all people who are subject to subordination
(whether already disabled or not) should have - not to be broken,
damaged, or sickened.
In important respects, this conception relates to Martha Fineman's
paradigm of universal vulnerability,107 and more recently, to Ani Satz's
application of that paradigm to people with disabilities, 08 in that it
emphasizes that some aspects of disability should be recognized as a
universal concern. Both Satz and Fineman call for a move away from civil
rights or equal protection laws that focus on discrete populations as
supposedly immutably different and therefore vulnerable. My qualifier is
that although I think it can be argued that in one way or another, at least at
some time, anyone is vulnerable to subordination, 109 I am also interested in
106. See generally SAM R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2009).
107. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
108. Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 WASH. L.
REV. 513 (2008).
109. If age, for instance, is recognized as a vector of subordination (including both youth
and aging populations), then even people who experience every other demographic basis for
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a much more specific emphasis on vulnerabilities that are drastically
stratified and disproportionate based on racial, economic, gender, sexual,
disability, age, ethnic, or religious subordination. In other words, I am not
presuming that everyone is vulnerable to emergent disability (as compared
to disability at large), and I argue that extreme and compounded
vulnerability that occurs at the intersections needs to be more strenuously
attended to, whether inside or outside the frame of "universal" rights.
C. Impoverishment, Violence, and Collective Damage
Legal scholarly discourse even conceptualizing any term like
"emergent disability" is almost as new as the Convention. Nevertheless, the
language and framing in the World Programme in the early 1980s actually
already manifested at least a substantial, albeit flawed, cognizance of what I
mean here by "emergent disability rights." To illustrate this point, I return
directly to the two texts. I acknowledge again that the "rehabilitation" and
"prevention" framing of the World Programme is problematic from a
number of important perspectives, as is the over-reliance on a supposedly
objective medical model; my critique of the Convention is not meant as an
endorsement of its predecessor. Disclaimers aside, on the relationship
between disability, victimization, and torture, the Programme states that:
With the emergence of "victimology" as a branch of criminology,
the true extent of injuries inflicted upon the victims of crime,
causing permanent or temporary disablement, is only now
becoming generally known.
Victims of torture who have been disabled physically or mentally,
not by accident of birth or normal activity, but by the deliberate
infliction of injury, form another group of disabled persons.110
Several things are salient in this language. First, as noted in Part I of
this Article, the relationship between disability and experiences of
victimization is implicated in and informs the recognition of disablement.
Second, the Programme recognizes that torture produces disability. And
third, the Programme designates people who are disabled by torture as a
distinct and legally recognizable population. The UN Convention also
explicitly takes on the issue of torture, and it acknowledges incarceration or
state violence, and scientific experimentation as related issues. The
addition of the latter two (incarceration and experimentation) can certainly
be recognized as, at least in one sense, a positive expansion of the World
Programme to acknowledge human rights abuses more thoroughly.
social and political privilege have at least a limited experience of vulnerability during their life
course.
110. Programme, supra note 4.
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However, I contend that the framing of torture is also more limited.
Article 15 of the Convention, titled: "Freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," reads as follows:
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be
subjected without his or her free consent to medical or scientific
experimentation.
States Parties shall take all effective legislative, administrative,
judicial or other measures to prevent persons with disabilities, on
an equal basis with others, from being subjected to torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
The first part of the text, specifically in the phrasing "no one," could be
read as an implicit affirmation that people have a right not only to be free
from torture and violence, but also to be free from being violently disabled
by those experiences. However, this is a somewhat generous reading,
when considered in light of the second part, which emphasizes that "on an
equal basis with others," people with disabilities should not be more
vulnerable to or subject to being tortured or abused. The UN Convention
generally condemns torture, and recognizes disproportionate vulnerability
to torture can be caused by disability discrimination. However, particularly
in comparison with the World Programme, it otherwise imposes no
obligation on its state signatories to consider disability as a consequence of
torture, or to ever consider the specific rights or identities of people who are
disabled by torture.
To continue in this vein, I turn next to the issue of the disabling
consequences of poverty and warfare. The World Programme, as noted,
identifies poverty as a primary cause of disablement, delineating multiple
dynamics enveloped in the relationship between poverty and disability.
First, phenomena such as "malnutrition, infection and neglect" are direct
mechanisms of poverty that result in medical harm.112 Second, lack of
accessible, affordable healthcare helps to ensure resulting or lasting
"impairment."113 Third, the Programme charts out a relationship between
warfare, economic devastation, and resource scarcity, as intersecting
mechanisms of disablement, phrased as follows:
In many countries, the prerequisites for achieving the purposes of
the Programme are economic and social development, extended
services provided to the whole population in the humanitarian
area, the redistribution of resources and income and an
111. Convention, supra note 1, art. 15.
112. Programme, supra note 4.
113. Id.
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improvement in the living standards of the population. It is
necessary to use every effort to prevent wars leading to
devastation, catastrophe and poverty, hunger, suffering, diseases
and mass disability of people.114
The Programme's framing of the victims of violence in warfare is both
generally acknowledged here in the phrasing "mass disability of people,"
and further delineated in the designation of war refugees as a specific class
of disabled persons:
There are over 10 million refugees and displaced persons in the
world today as a result of man-made disasters. Many of them are
disabled physically and psychologically as a result of their
sufferings from persecution, violence and hazards. Most are in
third-world countries, where services and facilities are extremely
limited. Being a refugee is in itself a handicap, and a disabled
refugee is doubly handicapped.' t 5
Here the language parallels the recognition of victims of torture as a
specific class of disabled persons, and further acknowledges that refugee
status can be both medically/physically disabling, and also that the social
and legal treatment of refugees parallels and infuses the treatment of
people with disabilities as another kind of "handicap."
Taken in totality, the Programme implicitly recognizes what I think of
as "escalating disablement," which I break down into four components.
First, trauma, injury, illness, or impairment originates in a violent context
and affects one or more classes of persons. Second, the economic and social
dislocation in that context further ensure that the disability cannot be
avoided or adequately remedied (for instance by structural safety and
adequate healthcare), and becomes aggravated and/or permanent. Third,
the combined stigma and subordination accompanying the disability itself,
and the social position of the person (for instance, as a refugee, poor person,
or torture survivor), ensure aggravated social and economic marginality,
which then are likely to engender more disablement. And fourth, because
the process of "mass" disablement is affecting whole communities, the
ability of communities or states to take care of or compensate for the
heightened needs of individual injured members is increasingly
compromised.
It should be noted that the Programme specifically acknowledges the
dynamic of reciprocal causation between poverty and disablement, stating:
While the risk of impairment is much greater for the poverty-
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or the occurrence of disability in the family, often places heavy
demands on the limited resources of the family and strains on its
morale, thus thrusting it deeper into poverty. The combined effect
of these factors results in higher proportions of disabled persons
among the poorest strata of society. For this reason, the number of
affected families living at the poverty level steadily increases in
absolute terms.11 6
This passage particularly embodies most of the elements I describe above.
In contrast, the UN Convention, while recognizing the disproportionate
rates of poverty among people with disabilities, completely lacks any
historicized or socio-structural analysis for the strong correlation between
the two. The preamble states: "[h]ighlighting the fact that the majority of
persons with disabilities live in conditions of poverty, and in this regard
recognizing the critical need to address the negative impact of poverty on
persons with disabilities." 117
This language is echoed in Article 28, which mandates that people with
disabilities (with some attention to females and aging populations
specifically, within the category of people with disabilities) should have
access to poverty reduction programs. 118 While I certainly agree that the
impact of poverty on persons with disabilities is important, the question of
a legal right to poverty relief only appears to come to bear when people are
already disabled. The critical point is that, as the Programme
acknowledges, poverty is in itself medically hazardous to people who are
not already legally cognizable as persons with disabilities. Disability rights
in this conception implicate the right to become less poor, or not to become
more impoverished, only after poverty has already wrought harms to the
body, psyche, and longevity. This temporal factor - that is, whether
"disability rights" begin only after disablement or whether they can include
the right not to be disabled by economic stratification or violence -
represents the core ideological and structural difference between the two
documents.
Paralleling this point, while Article 25 of the Convention discusses the
healthcare rights of persons with disabilities, all recognition that healthcare
access and state investment in healthcare is essential in preventing the
origin, exacerbation, or escalation of disability disappears. There is no
commitment to universal or universally affordable healthcare; the framing
in Article 25 emphasizes only that people with disabilities should not
experience (comparative) discrimination in healthcare access. 119 Where the
reference group for "discrimination" is other members of the population
who also have no organic right to healthcare, and may be at high risk of
116. Id.
117. Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
118. Id. at art. 28.
119. Id. at art. 25.
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disablement in contexts of warfare or poverty, there is no way, within the
parameters of the Convention, to name lack of adequate healthcare as an
inherent violation of international disability law. Article 27 of the
Convention charts out broad principles related to economic opportunity
and non-discrimination in employment as follows:
States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities to
work, on an equal basis with others; this includes the right to the
opportunity to gain a living by work freely chosen or accepted in a
labour market and work environment that is open, inclusive and
accessible to persons with disabilities.120
The Article then goes on to delineate eleven steps States Parties should
undertake to ensure the actualization of the "right to work" for persons
with disabilities, including "those who acquire a disability in the course of
employment." 121 In its breadth and expectations relative to the labor rights
of people with existing disabilities, this section of the Convention is more
developed and more stringent than the Programme and expands in
significant respects beyond the mandates and definitions delineated in U.S.
domestic statutes such as the ADA or Rehabilitation Act. 122
The sole - but I contend very significant - loss is that unlike the
Programme, the Convention does not recognize economic stratification as a
cause of disablement. At best, the brief acknowledgement of "those who
acquire a disability during the course of employment" might very vaguely
suggest some recognition of the fact that work itself can be grueling,
exploitative, and thereby disabling. However, once again, this is a
conceptual stretch. A critique of labor exploitation or health degeneration
is not explicit in this framing of equal protection. I should qualify this
observation by noting that the Programme also does not thoroughly
confront or name labor exploitation (as opposed to "poverty" at large) as a
cause of disablement; my point here is that the recognition of economic
crisis as a cause and aggravation of disability at least keeps open the
possibility of exploring how specific dimensions of poverty (such as
exploitability) manifest as disabling harm. In any case, my ongoing critique
applies here too - the economic and labor rights begin only after
disablement has occurred and are never explicitly mediated or framed in
terms which consider the relevance of disability's history or origin to the
breadth or depth of individual (or communal) disability rights. This point
is made more acute when considering that while the Programme identifies
warfare and resulting "mass disability" as a primary concern, the words
"war" and "warfare" are entirely absent from the Convention.1' 3 The
120. Id. at art. 27.
121. Id.
122. Americans with Disabilities Act 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006); The Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2010).
123. Progranune, supra note 4; Convention, supra note 1.
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global North and the U.S. specifically played a role in this excision, in
opposition to advocacy from landmine survivor advocacy NGOs and
networks that proposed building remedial and rehabilitative rights related
to mine-inflicted injuries/disabilities into the language of the
Convention.124
D. Gender, Age, and Disability Intersectionality
The concept of "disability intersectionality," to the extent that it exists
at all in social and legal discourse, is generally articulated as a fairly mono-
dimensional critique of identity essentialism.125  By this I mean that
discussions of the intersection of categories such as gender and disability
usually do not venture far beyond a basic acknowledgement of
compounded vulnerability, based on an "additive" conception of
subordination in which vulnerability + vulnerability = a plethora of
negative events and consequences for women (and sometimes girls) with
disabilities. Although the recognition of vulnerability and compounded
harm is very important, there is more to say about how the dynamics of
subordination shape, infuse, and constitute one another. In advancing this
critique, once again it bears noting that I do not hold the World Programme
up as a paragon of carefully constructed analysis or legal discourse.
Certainly its content embodies a medical model of disability, reflecting the
influence of the World Health Organization in its construction.126 Further,
it can easily be argued that to the extent that it conceives of an interaction
between gender and disability, or age and disability, the conception is also
fairly additive, rather than recognizing complex intersectional erasure or
harm. My contention is only that comparatively, the Convention affords
even less opportunity to consider what it means to locate disability rights in
a context fully cognizant of the gender and age-based politics of
subordination.
The World Programme describes the particular status of women as
follows:
The consequences of deficiencies and disablement are particularly
serious for women. There are a great many countries where
women are subjected to social, cultural and economic
124. See Landrmine Survivors Network, Disability Negotiations Daily Summaries & Disability
Negotiations Bulletins (2002) (on file with author or available through organization).
125. See, e.g., de Alwis, supra note 98. I do not mean to discount that the author in question
is taking up a substantial challenge in articulating a model of disability intersectionality, given
the relative theoretical void. My critique here is only that the conception of "intersectionality"
can extend beyond a critique of essentialism in order to address the fusion and co-constitution
of subordinating institutions and dynamics.
126. For an excellent critical discussion of the paternalistic and colonizing premises and
praxis of the World Health Organization, see Tanya Titchkosky & Katie Aubrecht, The Anguish
of Power: Remapping Mental Diversity with an Anticolonial Compass, in BREACH-ING THE COLONIAL
CONTRACF: ANTI-COLONIALISM IN THE U.S. AND CANADA (A. Kempf ed., 2009).
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disadvantages which impede their access to, for example, health
care, education, vocational training and employment. If, in
addition, they are physically or mentally disabled, their chances of
overcoming their disablement are diminished, which makes it all
the more difficult for them to take part in community life. In
families, the responsibility for caring for a disabled parent often
lies with women, which considerably limits their freedom and
their possibilities of taking part in other activities.127
Several points in this text merit explication. First, the Programme
identifies gender exclusions and subordination as an overall problem.
Second, it notes that these same dynamics are a reason why people are less
able to 'overcome' disablement. This statement could be interpreted as a
reference to not being able to recover from disabling harm, relative to other
sections of the Programme that explicitly consider possibilities for
recuperation after infection or illness.128  Or it could be more
straightforwardly interpreted as referencing the socio-economic
discrimination people with disabilities face. In either event, it
acknowledges that gender complicates the experience and navigation of
disablement. Third, the text conceives of disability as a kind of "women's
issue" in terms which are reflective of a more familial or communal
conception of gendered care-giving. In other words, it acknowledges that
disability is a gender issue, in terms not reducible only to disability's
manifestation in individual women who are identified as disabled.
In contrast, although gender is briefly acknowledged in a few places in
the text of the Convention, it is mostly compartmentalized to a minimal
discussion in Article 6, titled "Women with Disabilities." This Article
contains two sentences. The first reads as follows: "States Parties recognize
that women and girls with disabilities are subject to multiple
discrimination, and in this regard shall take measures to ensure the full and
equal enjoyment by them of all human rights and fundamental
freedoms."129
The phrase "multiple discrimination" constitutes most of the
Convention's engagement with the specific disability experiences of women
and girls. The totality also includes, as noted, recognition that poverty
reduction programs for people with disabilities should sometimes be
gender-specific or targeted, and a note in the preamble acknowledging the
combined dynamics of gender/disability-based violence.' 30 The second
sentence in Article 6 is essentially an affirmation of women's human rights,
in terms evocative of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. 3 1 Read somewhat generously, it can also
127. Programme, supra note 4.
128. Id.
129. Convention, supra note 1, art. 6.
130. ld. at pmbl.
131. Convention on the Elinination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A.
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be interpreted as an acknowledgement of an overall problem of gender
subordination with presumably some relationship to disability, though
with less specificity than the Programme.
The treatment of age in the two documents is not drastically different,
but on this count, I also suggest that the Programme affords more
possibilities for conceiving of emergent disabilities. The Programme reads:
"For many children, the presence of an impairment leads to rejection or
isolation from experiences that are part of normal development. This
situation may be exacerbated by faulty family and community attitudes
and behavior during the critical years when children's personalities and
self-images are developing." 132
This text at least implicitly appears to acknowledge the prospect of
some elements of "escalating disablement," as I have defined it above, in
the sense that it indicates that the social consequences of disability
subordination may further impair or damage children or youth. It should
be acknowledged that, as with gender, the Programme does not go as far
here as it does with poverty, warfare, and racism, in terms of
acknowledging that the vulnerability and subordination of youth in itself
can be disabling for those who do not have pre-existing disabilities. A
more thorough conception of emergent disability would also acknowledge
that the problems of child abuse and neglect, and the disproportionate
impoverishment of children specifically, are a substantial cause of or
contributing factor to medical disabilities which may emerge later in life.' 33
That said, the Convention is even more minimal, limiting most of the
acknowledgement of youth to Article 7, where it states simply: "States
Parties shall take all necessary measures to ensure the full enjoyment by
children with disabilities of all human rights and fundamental freedoms on
an equal basis with other children." 134
Here again, the conception of disability rights is reframed as a basic
norm of equal treatment, with the primary reference group in this instance
being children at large. Though children with disabilities are
disproportionately vulnerable to a number of forms of abuse, neglect or
discriminatory treatment, the vulnerability of all children to disablement is
not present in this kind of equal protection paradigm. On the other end of
the age spectrum, the Programme acknowledges the specificity of the
experiences of aging populations (who make up a large number of the
disabled), in terms of needing specific services, prevention programs, and
support. 3 5 The UN Convention is not drastically different in this regard -
acknowledging the specific health needs and poverty reduction needs of
the elderly in Articles 25 and 28, respectively, though somewhat more
Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/ Res/34/180 (Dec. 18,1979).
132. Programme, supra note 4.
133. See A.R. El-Channam, The Global Problems of Child Malnutrition & Mortality in Different
World Regions, 16 J. HEALTH Soc. POL'Y 1 (2003).
134. Convention, supra note 1, art. 7.
135. Programme, supra note 4.
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briefly." 6
Evaluating the two documents relative to their respective capacities to
acknowledge "intersectionality" is tricky, and depends in part on how one
conceives of the term. If intersectionality is interpreted primarily as a
critique of essential identity constructs or as a recognition of compounded
vulnerability,1 7 then the Convention accomplishes, at least, surface
recognition. This is explicit in section P of the preamble, which says that
state signatories to the Convention are "[cloncerned about the difficult
conditions faced by persons with disabilities who are subject to multiple or
aggravated forms of discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic, indigenous or
social origin, property, birth, age or other status." 38
I qualify that the recognition is mostly surface-level, since as detailed in
the previous examples, any specific explication of how discrimination is
aggravated is limited to occasional acknowledgement that at the
intersections people may be more poor or more abused. There is virtually
no discussion of why or how, or what population-specific remedies or
resources should entail. However, my task in this section, and in the
Article at large, is to argue that the recognition of the rights and needs of
people with emergent disabilities requires more than an acknowledgement
of compounded vulnerability and begs for more historicization. In this
regard, although the UN Convention largely matches at least the basic
acknowledgement of the variety of identities present in the Programme,
relative to gender and age, as with poverty it represents an elision of the
politics of emergent disability, from international disability law.
E. The Disappearance of Race-Consciousness
The comparison of the two documents relative to race is in some
respects even simpler, given that, as noted, race has almost disappeared
from the Convention. To review the text of the Programme again, the most
salient text reads:
136. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 25, 28.
137. I would stress however, that this more limited conception of intersectionality, though
not uncommon, poorly reflects the origin of the term as reflected in the works of Kimberl6
Crenshaw, who first defined it. Crenshaw was intentional in her articulation not just of severe
vulnerability or harm, but in her critique of institutional abilities to comprehend the workings
of intersecting systems of domination. In other words, Crenshaw's conception of
intersectionality would likely require attention to systemic dynamics by which people of color
and women and girls with disabilities are barred from recognition, recourse, or opportunity,
involving a critique of institutional politics. Mere recognition of difference, or even
compounded vulnerability would only represent a partial application of an intersectional
analysis, within this paradigm. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, supra
note 97; Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, & Violence Against
Women of Color, supra note 97.
138. Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
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It is necessary to use every effort to prevent wars leading to
devastation, catastrophe and poverty, hunger, suffering, diseases
and mass disability of people, and therefore to adopt measures at
all levels to strengthen international peace and security, to settle all
international disputes by peaceful means and to eliminate all
forms of racism and racial discrimination in countries where they
still exist.139
I do not mean to ignore existing critiques of the limitations of UN
conceptions of peace and security relative to racial domination, 140 and again
must question the presumption that there are UN member nations where
racism is absent. Nevertheless, the critical point here is that the Programme
acknowledges at least one dynamic by which racism generates collective
and mass experiences of disablement. It also uses this premise as the
foundation to frame the elimination of racism as critical to a disability
rights platform. Further, in acknowledging refugees, victims of torture,
and victims of warfare as specific populations who experience disablement,
it at least begins to create a conceptual basis for population-specific
disability rights claims based on racially disparate violence and
subordination. In other words, the Programme is closer to a cultural or
collective rights model when compared to the Convention.
The question of what disability equality means also becomes more
pressing when the two documents are considered through a race-conscious
lens. Critical race scholars in law,141 race-conscious scholars in arenas such
as public health and sociology,1 42 as well as NGOs and grassroots
community organizerS143 have repeatedly made the link between racism
and premature mortality, disproportionate rates of stress or poverty-linked
illnesses and diseases. Many also acknowledge and critique corresponding
constraints on opportunities and quality of life. My task in this Article is
not to establish this basic point. Disability and legal scholars who are
willing to attend to the issue already have substantial basis to know that
racism is destructive to the body and psyche, and that where it does not
immediately cause death, it hastens it. My intervention here, and in other
work,144 is to disrupt silence about the disabling and eventually fatal
consequences of racial subordination. This silence negates the potential to
recognize where and how race bears on the meaning of, and access to,
139. Programme, supra note 4.
140. See, e.g., Jussi M. HANHIMAKi, THE UNITED NATIONS: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
(2008); ALEXANDRA XANTHAKI, INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AND UNITED NATIONS STANDARDS: SELF-
DETERMINATION, CULTURE & LAND (2007).
141. See, e.g., Pokempner & Roberts, supra note 32.
142. See, e.g., Mays et al., supra note 36.
143. See, e.g., Alejandro Reuss, Cause of Death: Inequality, DOLLARS & SENSE MAG. (2001),
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Health/ CauseDeathjInequality.html (last visited June
23, 2009).
144. See Beth Ribet, Surfacing Emergent Disability within a Critical Race Theoretical Paradigm,
GEO. J. ON L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. (forthcoming 2011).
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disability rights and disability law, and now international disability law.
The fact that the relationship between race, racism, and disability rights has
largely escaped notice in disability legal and advocacy spheres is disturbing
and should engender much more critical concern than it has thus far.
Here the Programme's language about primary prevention again
merits careful scrutiny. The Programme explicitly states that in addition to
preventing warfare and combating racism, some of the mechanisms for
combating the creation of new and avoidable impairments include:
"improvement of the educational, economic and social status of the least
privileged groups . . . introduction of specific intervention measures
through better nutritional practices; improvement of health services . . .
prenatal and postnatal care.. .education regarding environmental hazards;
and the fostering, of better informed and strengthened families and
communities."1 45
I do not intend to overstate or romanticize the potential of this type of
public health and social welfare agenda, or indeed to read it as more
explicitly race-conscious than it in fact is. If anything, I would argue that
the links to racial subordination in this section are inadequate - the
conception of racism as an origin of the problem of disablement is too
limited - when primarily focused on warfare and violent conflict. The
Programme's language is in this regard fairly reflective of the platforms of
the World Health Organization,146 and other disability scholars have
already taken up the work of addressing the limitations of international
public health advocacy relative to the mechanics of globalization, and the
(de)historicization of colonialism as a disabling force.147 Again, however,
my supposition is that the Programme at least suggests that adequate
nutrition, a right to adequate healthcare, environmental safety, and an
economic and educational rights framework should be understood as part
of the project of realizing a disability-related right not to become
unnecessarily sickened or impaired.
Each of these issues - food, healthcare, environment (and
environmental racism), and access to quality education and employment -
is deeply racialized.148 The "least privileged groups" who experience
deprivation and damage are not discrete or singular. Disablement occurs at
the intersections of race, class, gender, sexuality, age, religion, and
citizenship status, as well as existing disability. My contention is that the
Programme is proffering at least a limited and initial basis that, at its
interpretive best, can be used to argue that a key concern for nations
145. Programme, supra note 4.
146. World Health Organization, The WHO Agenda,
httpi/Auw.who.int/about/agenda/en/index.hml (last visited June 23, 2009) [hereinafter WHO].
147. See Titchkosky, supra note 127 (analyzing the imposition of colonial norms of mental
health under the guise of public health advocacy).
148. See generally MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED
STATES (1994); EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTm: COLOR-BLIND RACISM &
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TIHlE UNITED STATES (2006).
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addressing disability rights must be to begin to remedy and dismantle
racial subordination. The rights of people who are disabled by or who are
seeking to not be disabled by racial subordination are limited - in some
places only hinted at - but they are at least conceivable.
My critique of the Convention, in contrast, extends beyond the elision
of the words "race" or "racism," though this is certainly striking. The
concrete mechanisms of racial subordination which, in practice, create
disabilities - economic subordination, deprivation of basic needs, lack of
access to information and formal education, and environmental destruction
- could have been pinpointed in the Convention (as they are in the
Programme) as phenomena which must be combated. The Convention,
however, does not do so. It essentially limits its intervention in each of
these areas - to the extent that they are acknowledged - to stating that
people with disabilities should not be targeted or disenfranchised in a
discriminatory fashion, when compared with the presumed reference
group: people who do not have disabilities.
Critical disability scholars have already taken up the challenge of
dismantling static constructions of disability which presume that any body
or psyche is normative or indeed entirely without disability; I will not
engage in a broader discussion of the idea of the mutability of disability
and normalcy here,149 other than to acknowledge it and the social
constructionist conception of disability which birthed it. However, even
without a substantial critical or sociological conception of disability, a race-
conscious analysis can have traction. Namely, I argue again that when
racism is a mass disabling force and people of color are disproportionately
already disabled or in a constant state of jeopardy at the hands of the state,
the idea that the totality of "disability rights" can and should be the right to
non-discriminatory treatment on the basis of existing disability will not be
adequate in addressing the most pressing concerns of people with
emergent disabilities.
Moreover, I suggest that the question of what it means to be
"discriminated" against on the basis of disability must be recognized as
racially disparate and infused. The comparative reference group - people
who do not have disabilities - could mean several things. Keeping in mind
that people with emergent disabilities are disproportionately people of
color, is the alternative reference group people who are similarly situated
except for the presence of a recognized or diagnosed disability? If so, then
the right to economic opportunity, the right to healthcare, and even the
right to be free from torture or violence150 are measured against the
treatment of people who are vulnerable enough that they are also likely to
be disabled at any moment. If the comparative reference group consists of
149. For more discussion of the social construction of disability and ability, see CRITICAL
DISABILITY THEORY, supra note 21.
150. This point, as noted, is indicated in the Convention in its emphasis on equal (i.e. like)
treatment across multiple areas of concern. Convention, supra note 1.
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a broader formulation of people who do not have disabilities, without the
qualifier of being similarly (racially, economically, spatially, or sexually)
situated, then how does one name what forms of discrimination are
disability-based? For instance, is it cognizable disability discrimination
when we consider the economic status of a person who has suffered
multiple and substantial disabling consequences of racism and poverty and
is held to be under- or unemployable based simultaneously on lack of
educational attainment, lack of (middle- or upper-class) professional
experience, and the barriers multiple disabilities pose both in themselves,
and in an inaccessible economic context? Is the contrast point a western,
white, middle-class professional who has had the health benefits of class
and racial privilege but is also in many regards trained and socialized to
successfully navigate a racial (and gendered) political economy?
These questions are, as is evident to anyone versed in critical race
theory in law, about the nature and problem of racial intersectionality in
law'-" with particular scrutiny of the relationship between race and
disability.152 The problem I am attempting to delineate is more than an
acknowledgement of compounded vulnerability (an element of an
intersectional critique, though not its totality).153 Where race not only
coincides with disability but also is embodied in the praxis by which racism
is directly disabling, the prospect of legally naming "disability
discrimination" requires recognition that race and disability are
intersectional and in the context of imperialism and white supremacy,
inextricable. Disability discrimination (this person is too impaired, too
limited, too damaged, has too many needs, is too "expensive") can
rationalize the subordination of racialized populations, while locating the
practice in a presumably objective medical truth that is ostensibly distinct
from race. The right not to be discriminated against on the basis of
disability has terribly limited meaning absent recognition of the fact that
disablement itself is already so often caused by subordination and that the
day-to-day mechanics of discriminatory treatment are always already
informed by and complicated by an interdynamic of race, class, gender,
age, citizenship, and sexuality.
It is not only disability as a discrete, singular phenomenon that causes
people with emergent disabilities to be shut out of access to the resources
151. See Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, supra note 97; Crenshaw,
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, & Violence Against Women of Color, supra
note 97.
152. Although Crenshaw does not engage disability in her work, I attempt to acknowledge
and delineate disability as a dynamic inextricable (along with class, age, sexuality, religion,
and citizenship) from the race and gender-based subordination she confronts. Id.
153. 1 qualify here that I am not suggesting that the model of intersectionality originating
in legal Critical Race Theory, and embodied in Crenshaw's seminal work, is itself limited to an
additive analysis or exclusive emphasis on compounded harm. I make this point since I
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that improve quality of life and guarantee the right to exist. The same
subordinating forces which frequently create disability ensure - in tandem
with and through intensified disability subordination - that projects of
racial, gender, and economic destruction will be successful. That is, racism,
sexism, classism, heterosexism are effective in breaking their targets, and
ableism, or disability subordination operate synergistically to ensure that
the 'broken' will remain unrecognized and without social or legal
remedy.154 In this sense, disability subordination - encompassing but not
limited to the types of legal, social, and economic discrimination embodied
in equal protection law - is a mechanism deeply entrenched in, reliant on,
and, in fact, driven by white supremacy and colonialism. Disability is not
just complicated by, compounded by, or coincident with race, gender,
sexuality, class, age, citizenship, or related subordinated statuses. For
people with emergent disabilities, disability subordination is also a vehicle
or mechanism of supposedly distinct forms of domination. Therefore, I do
not hesitate to conclude this piece of my analysis by suggesting that no
conception of "disability rights" can be functional while not also being,
among other things, explicitly race-conscious, both in acknowledging race
in more than token terms, and in taking on the challenge of dismantling
racial subordination as a disability-based project.
It should be acknowledged that neither document, the Programme nor
the Convention, gets anywhere near a race-conscious conception of
"disability rights" as expansive as my theoretical contemplation explained
above. However, the Programme's prevention language, as flawed and
troubling as it also is, contains that one absolutely essential bi-part building
block of a conception of international disability law which is accountable to
and existing for people with emergent disabilities - the recognition of
disablement, and at least a minimat contemplation of related and specific
rights.
F. Equality and Emergent Disability
This analysis begs the question implicit in this Article's title: what does
"equality" mean for people with emergent disabilities? I pose the question
both for the purpose of exploring some possible dimensions of the answer
from my own perspective as a feminist, critical race/disability theorist, and
as a means to reconsider the meaning and implications of the terms
"equality" and "equalization of opportunities" as they manifest within
international disability law. Part II.C contains the elements of a critique of
formalist notions of equality embodied in anti-discrimination, as contrasted
with anti-subordination principles. Both feminist legal and critical race
154. Russell and Stewart's conception of "disablement" is helpful here, in capturing the
phenomenon of disability subordination as a process of legal and social constitution. Russell
& Stewart, supra note 61.
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scholars have put painstaking effort into delineating the distinction;5 5
formalist conceptions of equality suffer from a number of critical problems,
relevant to the question of equality in international disability law. Most of
these critiques are already present in this Article, but I synthesize them here
in order to consider the implications of disability equality as a human rights
model and legal agenda.
First, at least as represented in the Convention, the meaning of equality
is premised on a model of like or at least even treatment. Although the
Convention makes a few minimal gestures towards basic human rights
standards both by affirming the United Nations' other Conventions, and
through explicit language in a few of the articles (e.g., no one should be
tortured), 156 the Convention does not call on state signatories to uphold
such strong standards relative to the right to healthcare, economic well-
being, education, housing, or social status, such that "equal" treatment will
necessarily amount to adequately humane treatment. In a sense, the
conception of non-discriminatory treatment is particularly evocative of
existing critiques of U.S. equal protection paradigms.157 One element of a
broader systemic subordinating structure is acknowledged and
condemned, but in the process the validity of naming any of the many
inter-related and inextricable elements of subordination is undermined. To
clarify, the construction of disability rights primarily based on a conception
of like or even treatment with people who are not disabled reinforces the
idea that disability subordination is reducible to individual experiences of
prejudicial or disparate treatment, and that questions of disablement, or
basic collective and individual rights to health and quality of life are not
essential to ensuring material and meaningful disability equality. I should
acknowledge that my critique adheres to the specific articles of the
Convention, and is at least slightly belied in the preamble, and in particular
sub-section v, which contains a broader affirmation of the right to access
education and healthcare.158 However, absent any specific commitments or
mechanisms which support not just non-discriminatory or comparable
degrees of access, but rather an inherent right, my critique holds. 1 59
Second, a conception of meaningful equality for people with emergent
disabilities simply cannot be temporally limited to the period when overt or
manifest disability discrimination is named and present. Building on my
first point, if the United Nations had posed the question to communities
and populations of people with disabilities - "As a person with one or more
disabilities, how are you treated differently than other people, and what are
155. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 107; CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 103.
156. Convention, supra note 1, art. 15.
157. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 106; ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING
JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2003).
158. Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
159. That is, 1 contend that the Convention does not mandate or even adequately implicate
a disability right to be free of disabling harm.
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some of the consequences?" - then one could read the various articles of the
Convention as a fairly thoughtful, albeit limited, attempt to recognize and
remedy various areas of discriminatory or differential treatment. It is
worth contemplating, however, the outcome if the question were not "how
are you treated differently," but rather involved a more expansive
methodology and empirical focus engaging how people with existing
disabilities (and particularly, emergent disabilities) experience the world,
what needs are most pressing, painful, or central, and how whole
communities are affected by the presence and dynamics of disablement. I
contend that it would become more readily apparent that in this context
notions of equality and justice which have no reparative or recuperative
agenda are deeply deficient. That is, it is not just the current presence of
disabilities, but the personal, political, and collective meanings of its violent
infliction which requires legal attention. In this Article, I make no pretense
of doing any empirical or sociological work extending beyond textual
interpretation. My anticipating or hypothesizing an imagined social
scientific project in this regard should not be interpreted as negation of the
need for the actual research. Nevertheless, I am taking the legal and
analytical liberty here of asserting the hypothetical in order to unpack some
of the presumptions of equality as posited in the Convention.
Returning briefly to Part I of this Article, I suggest that in this context
(international) disability law should take up the challenge of bridging
dislocated conceptions of disability in different areas of law - meaning
disability-as-injury or inflicted harm, and disability-as-identity or
stigmatized social condition. I must acknowledge that this is not a small
challenge and - as momentarily discussed in the introduction to this Article
- it runs afoul of at least some of the popular discourse of disability pride
typifying western disability rights movements.160 However, the need for
re-evaluation and legal reconstruction is pressing. I am intentionally
advancing the argument that it is not just inadequate, but that it can also be
injurious to elide the collective context of disablement from legal
recognition, and then premise the supposed condition of equality as if
needs for healing, remedy, or historicized public acknowledgement are
irrelevant to its actualization.
Third, in thinking about what "equality" means, it is helpful to look to
the Convention's definition of disability discrimination, which reads:
"Discrimination on the basis of disability" means any distinction,
exclusion or restriction on the basis of disability which has the
purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field. It includes all forms of
160. See SH-APIRO, supra note 18 (providing historical analysis of the construction of
disability pride in the U.S. disability rights movement).
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discrimination, including denial of reasonable accommodation. 161
To fully comprehend the implications of this phrasing, it is important to
also consider the Convention's definition of "reasonable accommodation,"
which is presented as follows: "'Reasonable accommodation' means
necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a
disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to
ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal
basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms."162
In Part I of this Article, I explored the implications of defining whether
accommodation is "reasonable," based on the burden imposed on an
employer or institution. It is helpful to revisit this argument here and
consider how emergent disability might complicate the question of whether
a burden is "disproportionate or undue."
The Convention does not define the terms explicitly, but it is
noteworthy that the language (which is not used in the Programme) is
essentially identical to the terminology of the Americans with Disabilities
Act.163  Although it should be acknowledged that individual state
interpretations of the meaning of the Convention (and compliance with its
tenets) will undoubtedly vary, to the extent that the Convention is
interpreted in similar terms to the western civil rights laws which helped to
generate it, a few points are salient. First, more than minimal expense will
likely be understood as a legitimate defense to disability discrimination, in
the sense that accommodations which cost money will be understood as
unreasonable. Second, to the extent that the Convention is indeed applied
similarly to U.S. domestic disability law, the question of employer or
institutional liability for generating the disability will not be understood as
relevant to the question of whether a burden to accommodate is "undue."
In other words, though causing disabling harm may, in theory, generate
accountability under some other area of international human rights or
domestic torts, labor, or civil rights law, it is distinguished from disability
discrimination. The consequence of this structuring of state accountability
leads to my third point, namely that it is not cognizable disability
discrimination or a violation of "disability rights" to, for example, dismiss
an employee who has been disabled by exploitative labor conditions.
In considering how this organization of "equality" compares to the
Programme, and to my own suppositions, I note the emphasis on the
premise that the prerequisites for "achieving the purposes of the
Programme" include "an improvement in the living standards of the
population." 64 Although this brief phrasing might appear to be a relatively
minor difference, the presumption that disability rights and equity require
161. Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
162. Id.
163. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006).
164. Programme, supra note 4.
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some universal baseline of economic rights or resources is especially
notable, particularly in the context of contemporary globalization.
Specifically, the Programme's framing is, I argue, comparatively friendlier
to an analysis which pinpoints and critiques mass and transnational
economic exploitation, invasive militarization, and destruction of local
economies as a cause of disablement. The Convention, in contrast, can
readily be interpreted as emphasizing only that those who are (somehow,
with virtually no reference to origin) impaired should not be comparatively
disadvantaged relative to those who have yet to be disabled.
Returning to my formative question, the consideration of "equality" for
people with emergent disabilities serves to problematize both the
structuring of international disability law and the prospective utility of the
term itself. On the first point, the crux of my analysis points to the
internationalization of a U.S. domestic conception of formal equality as
embodied both in constitutional equal protection frameworks, and in
related conceptions of (disability) civil rights as represented in statutes such
as the ADA. 165 Though I will not engage much more deeply here with the
dimensions of a critique already fairly well delineated by existing feminist
legal and critical race scholarship - namely the limitations of formalism as
compared to substantive notions of equality1 66 - my contribution to this
literature can be synthesized as follows: careful scrutiny of the UN
Convention indicates an elision of some of the more substantive elements of
an "equality" legal paradigm, as compared to the Programme. Further, this
move is not mono-dimensionally significant in terms of its impact on
disability-specific law; its consequences, when viewed from the perspective
of advocacy or consideration of people with emergent disabilities are not
neutral relative to race, class, age, economy, citizenship, sexuality, or
gender.
On the latter point, I acknowledge that the questions of justice implicit
in the idea of an adequate standard of living, freedom from violence,
environmental, cultural and spatial integrity, and rights to information and
opportunity are not all inherently or universally understood as the terrain
of "equality" or "equalization of opportunities." Certainly this contention
applies to a formalist notion of equality limited to concerns over disparate
treatment or overt discrimination. However, it also indicates a legal and
philosophical dilemma not at all unique to this context or analysis. That is,
can "equality" in a more substantive sense be presumptively coterminous
with well-being, collective political integrity, or even mass longevity and
survival? Or will laws constructed with equality as a primary or limiting
premise necessarily constitute an inadequate basis for the realization of
justice or cultural rights? My project in this Article is to echo critical
scholars who raise this question 67 and hopefully provoke further
165. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.s.C § 12101 et seq. (2006).
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consideration of the Convention as a case from which to consider the
relationships between equality discourse, international law, and issues of
global health and justice.
G. Can International Law Challenge Imperialism or Globalization?
Thus far, I have proceeded through this analysis without
acknowledging that some of the meta-issues vexing international legal
theorists and policy advocates are necessarily part of the context of this
discussion. Specifically, statutes and legal documents are contingently
interpreted, and their meanings are manifest through praxis. The text is not
separable from the power relations, transnational negotiations, and state
agendas which govern international legal discourse, negotiation, and
transaction. 68 Although I will not delve at all deeply into a broader
literature review here, acknowledging this point is critical to examining
some of the reasons for, and not just the import of, the differences between
the UN Convention and the World Programme. As noted in the
Introduction, the World Programme, though reflective of the contributions
of a range of entities, was never subject to the processes required to create a
Convention which binds its voluntary state signatories (i.e. "hard" law). It
was also far more reflective of the discourse embodied within the World
Health Organization,169 whereas the Convention emerged under the
auspices of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.170 Without
belaboring these particular structural variances, the question I wish to at
least minimally engage here is this: supposing the World Programme's
"prevention" imperatives and language about disablement had been
updated in accordance with the critical concerns of disability communities,
but not so thoroughly excised from the draft of the Convention presented to
the UN General Assembly - would it in fact have been possible to secure its
adoption and attract the commitments of member state signatories? Or to
get to the heart of this question, what threats, challenges, and implications
would an alternate UN Convention more sensitized to the rights and
concerns of people with emergent disabilities have posed within the
schemas of international law?
To unpack this question, it is helpful to revisit a few of the specific
agendas highlighted within the Programme. Though the Programme does
not explicitly mandate universal access to healthcare, it does indicate that
state responsibility for improved and expanded healthcare is critical to the
168. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAW & INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION READER (Beth A. Simmons & Richard H. Steinberg eds., 2006) (explicating the
point that legal texts must be interpreted contingently relative to the political situations,
histories, and interests of state powers which interpret and mediate them).
169. WH-O, supra note 146.
170. See Enable, supra note 1. 1 am indebted to Mark Weber for reminding me of the role of
the Department of Economic and Social Affairs in the construction of the Convention.
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achievement of its goals.' 71 The Convention is quite careful never to
indicate that states must at large take responsibility for healthcare
provisions, as opposed to monitoring or protecting its comparatively non-
discriminatory delivery - a platform which at least on its face, does not
ensure that non-discrimination implicates healthcare as an innate economic
right.172 Had the Convention embodied an imperative similar to the
Programme, state signatories would have to commit to a standard of state
responsibility for social welfare, which, for instance, currently exceeds the
U.S. domestic sphere as well as that of a number of other UN member
states.'73
Similarly, it is provocative to contemplate the prospects for U.S.
ratification of the Convention, had it contained recognition that victims of
torture have specific disability-based legal rights. Although the U.S.
administration under Barack Obama claims to be in the process of eventual
closure of its facilities in Guantanamo Bay, the notorious practices within
Guantanamo and similar sites (e.g. Abu Ghraib) are representative both of
past U.S. insistence that torture can be justifiable (notwithstanding the UN
Convention Against Torture), 174 and, relative to Guantanamo's inmates,
that so-called "enemy combatants" exist outside of a range of both domestic
and international legal protections.175 Beyond the direct contradiction a
stronger commitment to not engage in torture would entail with respect to
existing U.S. practices, for many UN member nations, acknowledging that
victims of state violence (also including refugees and victims of warfare)
have been concretely damaged to the extent that a new set of legal
(disability) rights are invoked could conceivably constitute a stronger
discursive/persuasive basis to pursue reparations claims or related cultural
rights advocacy. In other words, the recognition of emergent disabilities in
any specificity inherently invokes the prospect of increased state culpability
for human rights violations and macro-level infliction of collective medical
and psychological damage. Here, the comparison with the existing
Convention is again quite drastic, in that within the Convention, the
relationship of states to people with disabilities is primarily to monitor,
dispense, or protect rights which relate to a status (disability) that, absent
any alternate recognition, will be understood solely as a condition inherent
in the person, rather than a cognizable social/violent creation.
I could continue in this vein, engaging, for instance, in more specificity
relative to the treatment of poverty and economic rights. However, I
171. Programme, supra note 4
172. Convention, supra note 1.
173. See generally SUSAN C. MAPP, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL WORK (2007) (speaking to the
dilemmas of advocacy in states with limited social welfare mandates and conceiving of the
challenges in transnational contexts).
174. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
175. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Resisting Guantanamo: Rights at the Brink of Dehumanization, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. 1683 (2009).
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believe the overarching point is evident. The passage of the Convention in
its current incarnation, and particularly its differences from the World
Programme are not mysterious or terribly surprising, given any minimal
acknowledgement of a broader critical human rights discourse
acknowledging tensions between individual state economic and political
agendas and the obligations imposed within robust (and partially only
imagined) human rights legal frameworks.176 It is not particularly striking
that the United Nations and its member states opted not to pass a more
substantive disability rights framework imposing significant burdens on
states to ensure collective health and well-being, commit to expansive social
welfare and community economic development programs, 177 and cease all
practices which engender disabling violence. Nor is it entirely surprising
that those disability communities and advocates who were involved in the
Convention advanced it in its current terms. I am not unsympathetic to the
imperative to provide at least an initial anti-discrimination framework as
opposed to nothing. The noteworthy point is that the choice to excise
recognition of "disablement," "mass disability," or emergent disabilities
from international disability law has occasioned so little response, even
among the cadre of critical scholars who generally occupy an "anti-
imperialist" stance relative to the role of the U.S. and western states in the
formation of human rights standards and instruments.
CONCLUSION
In concluding a critical exploration of anything as multi-faceted and
contentious as an international convention, some acknowledgement of the
limited scope of my lens and analysis seems merited. In this instance, I
want to acknowledge that this Article treats some under-explored terrain in
necessarily - for a single article - unsatisfying depth. The critique I am
advancing here of the formalist and conceptual limits of disability law is, on
its own, theoretically provocative. There is still virtually no legal literature
on emergent disability,178 and literature in other disciplines which examines
the intersections, rather than comparisons between disability and
demographics such as race and gender, is also severely under-developed.179
Critiquing the UN Convention in terms of the legal constitution and
subjectivity of people with emergent disabilities is an expansive project. It
cannot be achieved with the care and detail the subject merits without more
176. See Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma: Rethinking the Humanitarian
Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 259 (2004) (discussing the tensions between individual
state interests in the United States and the west, and humanitarian ideals).
177. Although the Programme is not entirely developed on these points, it is arguable that
realization of its goals vis- '-vis substantially improved health and standards of living would
certainly entail such a state burden, if translated into the text of a binding international
convention.
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foundation in existing disability, legal, and critical discourse. In some
respects, I base my critique on a paradigm of law and identity that does not
thoroughly exist anywhere, including within the World Programme.
Further, although I believe it is essential to advance this argument in terms
that are grounded in existing feminist and critical race theories, the notion
of intersectional analysis in this area is also half-imagined; I attempted both
to presume and argue that race, gender, class, disability, age, and sexuality
are co-constituted and deployed in terms that make isolated consideration
of any one parameter impossible. This presumption not only challenges the
framing of international disability law but also at least pushes to expand
the current articulation of much of existing critical legal theories, both in
centering disability (an oft-ignored vector of analysis), and in arguing that
racism, patriarchy, and economic exploitation are inherent in disability
subordination. Needless to say, to make this set of conceptual leaps, I am
implicating a number of substantive questions that I not only do not answer
in this Article but also will not attempt to thoroughly explicate in this work.
Nonetheless, I believe it is productive to identify some of the questions
furthered here, not only in anticipation of my own future work, but also in
hopes that international legal, critical race, disability, and feminist theorists
will take some of them up. First, the contemplation of disablement and
emergent disability brings up compelling and salient issues both for
disability lawyers, legal scholars and advocates, and for scholars and
advocates interested in the embodiment of racial, gender, class, sexual, and
age-based subordination. I must repeat that I have not really begun, in this
Article, to chart out carefully or comprehensively what rights or legal
claims might attach to emergent disabilities,180 if international and domestic
disability laws were to begin to redefine disability and disability rights in
relevant terms. However, this Article maintains that the questions
associated with enacting rights or law for people with emergent disabilities
should at least be asked, and their significance asserted. Though in some
respects, the Convention and its proponents rightly recognized the fluidity
of disability and the need to avoid stringent or exclusive definition, a
particular meaning of disability is nevertheless reinforced in the
Convention, in which disability is a primarily individual experience of
difference or impairment; it matters because of the treatment it engenders,
and not the treatment which may have engendered it. In this sense, my
critique raises a base question which I hope will begin to influence future
lawmaking. That question is: "what does disability mean?" I assert that
historicization, causation, and/or point of origin constitute part of the
answer.
180. The key assertions I have advanced here include the point that existing rights' frames
which do not consider the role of institutional perpetration or subordination in assessing state
or entity burden are inadequate, and also that some framework of rights to recovery or remedy
(without as yet, more delineation) should become part of disability rights or disability justice
parlance. The mapping of any comprehensive model of what "emergent disability rights"
entails is another project, beyond the scope of this Article.
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Second, what now? The Convention exists, and many committed,
smart, and impassioned disability advocates and the organizations and
communities they adhere to worked very hard to ensure that at least such a
thing as disability human rights might become part of international legal
discourse and praxis. Although my critique in this Article is not mild, it is
also not meant to obfuscate that the process of creating transnational legal
instruments is dense and virtually mandates compromise. In some
respects, it is the enervating privilege and luxury of the legal scholar to
contemplate what should have been, without solving all of the problems
inherent in getting anywhere near an idealized outcome. Notwithstanding
my critique of the erasure of emergent disability (with its various racial,
gendered, economic, sexual, and age implications), the Convention reflects
certain productive expansions on the concepts of access, accommodation,
and rights, when compared to for instance, the Americans with Disabilities
Act. These differences matter and should be used to accomplish what
substantive advocacy can be achieved for the benefit of people with
emergent disabilities - if not relative to disablement, at least relative to the
ongoing damage disability subordination inflicts in the aftermath.
However, this is also a productive moment to ask whether there are
prospects for shifting international disability law now. And while I will not
explore it in this Article, as an initial provocation, I will at least note the
prospect of creating an expanded platform within the boundaries of
international law which engages explicitly and energetically with
disablement, emergent disability. My imagining here would revisit but also
expand and improve on the Programme's invocations of race, poverty,
gender, warfare, age, and violently disabled populations. Given the
existing textual limits of the Convention and the challenges of amending a
newly enacted international law, such an effort would likely occur as a
distinct or new document.
Beyond calling for shifts in the construction of international law (a
challenge I am aware is profoundly demanding in time and resources), it
also bears considering why the UN Convention is functionally important in
influencing domestic legislation and practice. Signatory nations are
currently developing implementation plans and national strategies, at least
partly in response to the adoption of the Convention.181 The absence of an
international platform for emergent disability rights, or any specter of a
model of such rights in the Convention makes it much less likely that states
will incorporate anything beyond equal protectionist and welfare frames
into domestic legislative and policy initiatives. The Convention as
structured - while advancing several important civil rights agendas - also
serves to normalize the omission of state accountability for emergent
181. See, e.g., Australian Government, Department of Families, Housing, Community
Services & Indigenous Affairs, National Disability Strategy,
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disabilities from legal doctrine. Rather than solely calling for a remedy at
the international level it is helpful to acknowledge that new domestic
agendas are coalescing now. It may be more immediately meaningful to
develop advocacy and policy agendas in domestic contexts that attempt to
reassert the salience of emergent disability rights, despite the limitations of
the UN Convention as an international human rights standard.
This analysis highlights the intersectional co-constitution of
subordinating institutions such that disability is often not only not discrete
but also literally created by race, gender, class, sexuality, age, religion
citizenship, and nationality. Disability can be, among other things, a
(violent) production. I have intentionally and gratefully turned to critical
race theory and feminist legal theory in this Article (in an otherwise near-
vacuum in the literature in both law and much of disability studies), in
order to draw out some of the resonant dynamics between the erasure of
emergent disabilities from legal conception, and the politics of formalist
equal protection in domestic law. That said, there is not yet a developed
critical vocabulary or discourse that allows for the naming of this particular
dynamic, though obviously this Article is an attempt to catalyze dialogue.
Is this an effective expansion on the meaning of "intersectionality," as first
posited by critical race feminist Kimberle Crenshaw?182 In appreciation of
her work, and in hopes of contributing to the underlying anti-subordination
agenda, which I recognize in the CRT movement, I would be glad to be
confident in asserting that it is. However, I believe it is also productive to
use this question as a jumping off point to think more deeply about our
representations of the relationships between the universally relentless and
constantly specific and targeted dynamics of subordination that drive and
motivate critical scholarship. In that vein, I conclude with a compound
question continually present and never comprehensively resolved within
the totality of this analysis: how is disability produced by subordination,
and what should law do about it?
182. Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex, supra note 97.
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